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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s application of varying tiers of scrutiny to different constitutional rights 
has been widely criticized for severing rights from any clear connection with justice.  One school 
of thought holds that this could be cured by importing or expanding the role for “proportionality 
analysis” in U.S. constitutional rights doctrines.  American proponents of proportionality such as 
Jamal Greene, Vicki Jackson, and Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer have argued that U.S. 
courts could more transparently respect the connection between rights and justice by following 
the example of Canadian courts in reasoning about the proportionality of laws as “justified 
infringements” of rights.  Furthermore, proportionality analysis, a kind of “intermediate scrutiny 
for all,” is thought to foster a more reasonable and democratic rights discourse. 
This Article argues that proportionality analysis may not be the cure its American proponents 
hope for.  Comparisons between American and Canadian constitutional rights cases suggest that 
proportionality style reasoning conceptually devalues and distorts the connection between rights 
and justice.  In contrast, the alternative concept of rights as absolute relations of justice appears 
to more transparently value constitutional rights. 
The Article then turns to the prospective institutional effects of proportionality in the American 
context.  A rough sketch shows that the concept of courts allowing the state to proportionately 
override rights appears to be as scattered across different American doctrines and tiers of scrutiny 
as the concept of specifying the scope of rights absolutely.  The mixed record of proportionality 
in U.S. rights doctrines recommends drawing comparisons to Canada, where proportionality is 
employed under a uniform doctrine.  Comparing the effects of proportionality in the U.S. and 
Canada indicates that this approach institutionally disrupts the democratic settlement of rights 
disagreements in three ways.  First, proportionality analysis appears to inflate the number of rights 
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conflicts and intensify the rhetoric of those seeking to vindicate them.  Second, in many cases 
proportionality undermines the classic justification for entrenching rights in law and subjecting 
them to independent judicial review by allowing rights to be overridden according to the moral 
reasoning of judges.  Third, hopes that proportionality might lead to more democratic dialogues 
negotiating the meaning of rights between courts and legislatures should be checked by how the 
use of proportionality analysis by Canadian courts has discouraged legislative responsibility for 
constructing rights.  Interestingly, at least one prominent American example (Employment 
Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) suggests that treating rights as 
absolute trumps can encourage legislative responsibility for constructing the scope of rights. 
These conclusions are primarily negative, but the Article ends with two positive lessons: The first 
lesson is that rights should be thought of as absolute trumps, even if they are subject to reasonable 
disagreement about the scope of their requirements.  The second lesson is that ordinary statutory 
rights, such as the rights articulated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, should be 
recognized as potentially contributing to the scope of absolute constitutional rights.  This could 
help promote a more democratically reasonable way for American institutions to settle 
disagreements about rights.  These lessons could help reform the devaluations, distortions, and 
disruptions afflicting both American and Canadian rights jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Talk of American exceptionalism can be overblown, but U.S. 
constitutional rights jurisprudence is exceptional for eschewing one 
overarching standard for balancing rights.  That is, it lacks a uniform doctrinal 
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test for balancing the interests protected by rights against broader social goals 
and values.  While the U.S. experience with the judicial review of 
constitutional rights has run far longer than that of Europe or the 
Commonwealth, American courts have been comparatively more hesitant to 
embrace the idea that rights should be balanced for their ‘proportionality’ with 
other interests and values related to impugned laws.  American courts have 
avoided adopting a uniform standard for analyzing proportionate “limitations” 
on rights such as the Canadian Supreme Court’s Oakes test that guides 
Canadian courts to assess the legitimacy (i.e. importance), suitability (i.e. 
rational connection), necessity (i.e. minimal impairment), and balancing (in 
the stricter sense of weighing interests) of the state’s “infringements” of 
constitutional rights.1  This exceptionalism raises at least two important 
questions: First, to what extent does the lack of a uniform standard of 
proportionality analysis really insulate American rights jurisprudence from the 
practice of reasoning about proportionate infringements of rights?  Second, to 
what extent is it desirable for American rights adjudication to join the rest of 
the world’s courts in using proportionality analysis as a way of protecting 
constitutional rights? 
These questions are entangled in disputes about how to diagnose and cure 
the problems facing the American approach to constitutional rights.  Nearly 
everyone thinks that something ails American rights jurisprudence, but one 
prominent camp of scholars and judges think that many of its pathologies can 
be traced to the exceptional hesitancy of U.S. courts to engage in the kind of 
proportionality analysis of rights-claims that is ubiquitous in Canadian and 
European constitutional law.  This camp argues that although there may be 
elements of proportionality analysis in the doctrines U.S. courts use to assess 
claims concerning different rights, overall these doctrines tends to preclude 
balancing rights as interests against other goals and principles.  They also claim 
that because many of the difficulties of American rights jurisprudence can be 
traced to this tendency to eschew or hide balancing rights, a heavy dose of the 
modern type of proportionality review practiced in Canada and Europe could 
reinvigorate its rights doctrines.  American proponents of proportionality have 
recently offered a number of impressive arguments to advance their claims. 
 
 1 PAUL YOWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MORAL AND 
EMPIRICAL REASONING IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 16–18 (2018).  The leading case in Canada on the 
proportionality inquiry is R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).  Id. at 16 n.12.   
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For example, in his recent essay, Rights as Trumps?, Professor Jamal 
Greene provides a thoughtful diagnosis of U.S. rights jurisprudence and 
makes the case for importing proportionality analysis into its doctrines.2  He 
argues that the American approach to rights jurisprudence is largely 
dominated by the “categorical” framework of understanding rights as “trumps” 
that are “absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be 
limited.”3  Of course, he keenly notes that U.S. courts do not apply this rights-
as-trumps framework to all rights and circumstances in the same way.  To the 
more normative question, Greene argues that this American approach to 
rights-as-trumps may be justified in extreme cases of “government bigotry, 
intolerance, or corruption[,]” but also that the dominance of the rights-as-
trumps framework has distorted the ability of Americans to appreciate the 
reasonable character of many of their disagreements about rights and to 
resolve them democratically.4 
Greene is joined in making these claims by other scholars such as Vicki 
Jackson, who argues Canadian style proportionality analysis could help 
American courts achieve “transparency,” “bring constitutional law closer to 
constitutional justice[,]” build a “better bridge between courts and other 
branches of government,” and reveal “process failures” such as government 
partiality.5  Greene and Jackson’s arguments echo earlier calls by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer to promote the “active liberty” of 
democratic self-government by assessing the proportionality of the costs of 
restricting rights with their benefits.6 
These arguments are highly relevant to pressing issues in American rights 
jurisprudence.  Consider how claims about proportionality reasoning have 
 
 2 Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term–Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
28, 38 (2018). 
 3 Id. at 30. 
 4 Id. at 78–79,128. 
 5 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3103 (2015).  
See also Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative to Multiple Levels of 
Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 385 (2018) (asserting that the adoption of 
proportionality analysis based on the Canadian model will allow for a more coherent approach to 
cases involving individual rights); ALEC STONE SWEET & JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY 
BALANCING AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 119–20 (2019) (providing an example of how 
the Canadian parliament’s public record of proportionality analysis bolstered an act’s status as 
constitutional). 
 6 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 44 (2008). 
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been related to the arguments the U.S. Supreme Court heard in the case of 
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York.7  That case 
turned in part on whether New York City’s (now repealed) ban on transporting 
licensed, locked, and unloaded handguns to homes or shooting ranges outside 
of the city violates the “text, history, and tradition” of the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms.8  Incorporating proportionality into 
American rights doctrine along the lines advocated by Greene, Jackson, and 
Breyer could have recommended treating this Second Amendment rights 
claim as subject to something like intermediate scrutiny that balances the 
particular interests of New York City against the interests of gun owners.9  
Greene in particular advocates for proportionality as “a kind of intermediate 
scrutiny for all[.]”10  It has been argued that balancing these interests 
proportionately could have upheld the ban, or struck it down without 
disturbing the balancing evident in other cases.11  In contrast, some critics of 
proportionality who think that the U.S. tiers of scrutiny approach to rights is 
already laden with proportionality assessments have characterized Second 
Amendment cases such as New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n as a chance to 
abandon tiers of scrutiny in favor of defining the scope of rights in relation to 
the “text, history, and tradition of the Constitution.”12  Conclusions about 
whether rights are or should be proportionately balanced under different tiers 
of scrutiny will significantly shape how American courts assess rights-claims, 
even beyond the Second Amendment. 
The questions of what role proportionality plays or should play in 
American rights jurisprudence invite us to look abroad.  The widespread use 
of proportionality analysis by Commonwealth and European courts has given 
a comparative dimension to arguments in favor of importing it to the American 
 
7 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020). 
8 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. 
Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280). 
9 See Joseph Blocher, Response, Rights as Trumps of What?, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 120, 131–32 
(2019) (proposing that the Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n might apply “proportionality 
review” as suggested by Greene’s framework, which would align with the approach taken by federal 
courts in similar gun rights cases).  
10 Greene, supra note 2, at 58.   
11 Blocher, supra note 9, at 132. 
12 Joel Alicia and John D. Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, 42 NAT’L AFFS. 72, 
73 (2019); see, e.g., id. (calling for the abandonment of the tiers of scrutiny approach on the basis 
that they have no actual grounding in the Constitution). 
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context.  Canadian uses of the doctrine have been especially salient, perhaps 
because, like the United States, Canada is a common law jurisdiction with a 
partially written constitution, federalism, and an entrenched bill of rights in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.13  Greene, Jackson, and Breyer all 
point longingly to Canadian examples of judges assessing the proportionality 
of rights claims as illustrations of how to avoid the pathologies of right-as-
trumps. 
This Article argues that the proportionality approach to rights may not be 
the cure many American scholars take it to be.  From a dissident Canadian 
perspective, American claims about the benefits of proportionality review fail 
to adequately account for the ways the rights-as-proportionality framework can 
(I) undermine the conceptual connection between rights and justice, thereby 
devaluing rights; and (II) distort disagreements about the scope and nature of 
rights into disagreements about the value of rights. 
These arguments will compare some of the “categorical” American cases 
criticized by Greene and Jackson with recent cases of Canadian rights 
jurisprudence.  These comparisons suggest that proportionality analysis is not 
the cure for an ailing democratic rights jurisprudence in a common-law 
jurisdiction.  Instead, it may contribute to its pathologies.  These conceptual 
points also entail a critique of Ronald Dworkin’s ideal of rights as individual 
interests trumping the interests of the community.  This Article suggests that if 
we value the transparent connection of rights with justice, we should instead 
favor an account of rights as absolute relations of justice between persons 
situated in a political community.14  This absolute view of rights should be 
favored because it meets the conceptual desiderata of valuing the connection 
between rights and justice in a transparent way.  But these conceptual points 
do not necessarily explain the institutional effects of proportionality analysis 
on democracy. 
In order to evaluate the institutional effect that expanding the use of 
proportionality might have in the U.S. context, it is necessary to sketch the role 
it already plays in American rights jurisprudence.  Unfortunately, the very 
 
 13 The Charter is part of the Constitution Act.  See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 14 See generally GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION 
OF RIGHTS 12 (2009) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution can be both the foundation of democracy 
and subject to democratic discussion and change, meaning the “the limitation of constitutional rights 
will be seen to be an ongoing political process”). 
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devaluations and distortions of proportionality reasoning make it difficult to 
distinguish cases where it is employed.  As such, this Article will use its 
distinction between rights as proportionately overridable interests and rights as 
absolute relations of justice to provide a brief sketch (III) of how 
proportionality plays a mixed role in the various tiers of scrutiny the U.S. 
Supreme Court applies to different rights in different circumstances. 
This mixed record makes it all the more important to draw on Canadian 
comparisons.  Canada is particularly apt for comparison because the 
institutional effects of the Canadian Supreme Court’s use of proportionality 
analysis are more clear cut.  By comparing the institutional effects of 
proportionality, primarily in the American and Canadian contexts, this Article 
will argue (IV) that devaluing and distorting rights can disrupt democracy by 
(a) inflating rights, (b) undermining the case for their entrenchment and 
judicial review, and (c) fostering an undemocratic form of interrogative 
“dialogue” about rights between courts and legislatures. 
These institutional conclusions are primarily negative, but this Article is 
meant to also hold positive lessons.  To that end, this Article outlines two 
constructive lessons that can be gleaned from the way proportionality analysis 
can devalue and distort rights to the detriment of democracy (V).  The first 
lesson is that rights should be thought of as morally absolute, even if they are 
subject to reasonable disagreements about the scope of their requirements.  
Only by thinking of rights as morally absolute can their deep connection to 
justice be respected, and morally absolute rights can remain institutionally 
open to further specification.  Statutes and judicial decisions can each protect 
absolute rights in spite of being institutionally open to legislative changes and 
doctrinal revisions.  This is because such changes and revisions provide a 
means of further specifying their requirements in relation to changing 
circumstances. 
The second lesson is that in order to respect democratic disagreements 
about vague constitutional rights, statutory rights should be recognized as 
potentially contributing to the construction of the scope of constitutional 
rights.  This Article does not provide any comprehensive vision of how these 
lessons should influence American and Canadian rights jurisprudence.  But 
this Article does note that these lessons are consistent with the structure of the 
Canadian and American constitutions, and that implementing them in cases 
such as New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n promises to be a complex but 
feasible task. 
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Americans sometimes threaten to “move to Canada” in the wake of their 
elections; they should think twice about moving Canadian rights jurisprudence 
to their own courts.  This is an audacious argument, and one that could be 
thought better left to an American.  That may be, but as H. L. A. Hart once 
noted, “there are important aspects of even very large mountains which cannot 
be seen by those who live on them but can be caught easily by a single glance 
from afar.”15 
I. DEVALUED RIGHTS 
One problem with the American “categorical” approach of subjecting 
different types of rights to varying tiers of scrutiny is that it can disconnect rights 
from justice.  What does this mean?  On the one hand, this could mean that 
thinking about rights as subject to various tiers of judicial scrutiny disconnects 
rights from justice by allowing legislatures to override rights if they have a 
legitimate reason connected to their enactment (rational basis scrutiny), or if 
the enactment substantially promotes a state interest (intermediate scrutiny), 
or if it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest (strict 
scrutiny).16  On the other hand, it could be that this approach disconnects rights 
from justice by artificially narrowing what judges are free to consider and 
balance as the interests related to a rights dispute.  American proponents of 
proportionality analysis have generally taken the latter view regarding the 
devaluation of rights.  In this Part, I will first explain this claim, and then argue 
that it is conceptually mistaken. 
There are a number of recent arguments claiming to show how the 
“categorical” American approach to rights devalues the connection between 
rights and justice.  Professor Greene castigates the ideal of rights-as-trumps for 
disassociating rights from “notions of substantive justice.”17  Greene’s account 
of how the categorical American approach to rights devalues rights focuses on 
the way it shears the connection between justice and the many interests at stake 
in rights questions.  In a similar vein, Professor Jackson draws on Mark 
Tushnet’s scholarship to argue that the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus on “rules” 
 
 15 H. L. A. HART, Essay 4 American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 123 (1983). 
 16 YOWELL, supra note 1, at 21. 
 17 Greene, supra note 2, at 70. 
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categorizing constitutional rights has distracted it from “the purposes of the 
constitutional provision the rule is intended to implement” and thus turned its 
attention away from “constitutional justice[.]”18  Jackson shares Greene’s 
concern with the way categorical rights create the need for rights doctrine to 
consider “a fuller range of the factors that people in ordinary life consider 
reasonable” to “help re-establish the law’s connection to justice.”19  But she 
also emphasizes that the American categorical approach to rights can devalue 
rights where it develops arbitrary exceptions to rules defining the scope of 
rights.20  This Part will critique Greene and Jackson’s arguments to argue that 
proportionality analysis disconnects rights and justice by allowing rights to be 
overridden.  The first conceptual point is that both rights-as-trumps and rights-
as-proportionality can devalue rights by denying just rights claims.  The second 
conceptual point is that rights-as-proportionality uniquely devalues rights by 
requiring judges to assess whether rights can be justifiably overridden.  By 
allowing rights to be overridden, proportionality analysis intrinsically devalues 
the conceptual connection between rights and justice. 
On Greene’s telling, conceiving of constitutional rights as absolute legal 
protections against unjust state actions demeans the consideration of other 
collective interests and their connection to just rights.  For Greene, this is true 
of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of right-as-trumps, but also where American 
judges follow this theory by “categorizing” some rights as absolute trumps in 
relation to specific kinds of laws and circumstances, while leaving others less 
protected or unrecognized as rights.21  In contrast, he thinks that Canadian 
judges assessing the justification of rights “infringements” use this technique to 
avoid arbitrarily excluding communal interests that bear on rights questions.22 
 
 18 Jackson, supra note 5, 3149–51.  Mark Tushet argues that Justice Breyer's dissent in Heller should 
"be understood as about the application of legal judgment to complex settings."  Id. at 3149 (citing 
Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Critique of Judgment, SUP. CT. REV. 61, 71, 76–84 (2008)).  In 
addition, Tushet has argued that the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions in certain cases 
“represent a form of 'judicial pathology,' . . . [which] is connected to the 'rule-ification' of the area and 
a related 'fear' of making obvious judgment calls on issues of degree.”  Id. (citing Mark Tushnet, The 
First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 105–06 (2012)). 
19 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3148.  
20  Id. at 3136-3142. 
21  See Greene, supra note 2, at 68–69 (discussing the weakness in Dworkin’s analysis of different 
types of racial classifications and arguing that Dworkin’s rights-as-trumps does not obligate the 
courts to treat all interests in the same way). 
22  See id. at 38–40 (giving an example of the Canadian Supreme Court balancing the interests of the 
public against the infringement of the rights of a few). 
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What is Dworkin’s theory of rights-as-trumps?  Dworkin’s mature theory 
of rights holds that rights protect the specific interests of individuals that 
“trump” the pursuit of the general welfare of the political community.23  What 
kind of interests protect rights-as-trumps?  Only individual interests threatened 
by prejudices and preferences inimical to citizens’ “equal concern and respect” 
are protected by rights-as-trumps.24  The interests normally protected by rights 
can be sacrificed for the common good only where they are justified by reasons 
not mired in anti-egalitarian prejudice, such as “when necessary to protect the 
rights of others, or to prevent a catastrophe, or even to obtain a clear and major 
public benefit[.]”25 
Greene’s critique of Dworkin’s argument is itself a way of critiquing the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to fundamental constitutional rights.  Greene 
argues that just as Dworkin’s ideal of rights blinds Dworkin to the connection 
between certain communal interests and just rights, so too does American 
courts’ tendency to categorize rights according to the kind of prejudice they 
protect against prevents judges from properly considering the true variety of 
rights at stake in cases.  For example, Greene thinks Dworkin’s ideal of rights-
as-trumps leads to the devaluation of just rights interests not threatened by 
majority preferences or prejudices, such as the interests of whites in 
affirmative-actions cases.26  
Greene finds evidence for his claim in Dworkin’s analysis of DeFunis v. 
Odegaard.27  In this case the plaintiff Marco DeFunis argued that affirmative 
action policies resulted in reverse racial discrimination against his admission 
to the University of Washington Law School in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.28  Dworkin thought that the plaintiff had no right against the 
discrimination of law schools because it was motivated by principled 
arguments about justice rather than prejudice.29  For Greene, the plaintiff’s 
 
 23 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 329 (2011) (explaining that increased safety, as 
an example of general welfare, is “trumped” by the right to give unpopular speeches in public streets, 
as well as the right of suspected terrorists to not be locked up indefinitely without judicial review of 
any charges against them). 
 24 Id. at 330. 
 25 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1977). 
26  Greene, supra note 2, at 67–70. 
27  416 U.S. 312 (1974).  
 28 Id. at 314.  
 29 DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 237–39. 
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interest does not override the affirmative action program, but does constitute 
a legitimate rights interest that requires special consideration rather than brute 
dismissal.30  While DeFunis was ultimately dismissed for mootness, Greene 
thinks the influence of Dworkin’s frame of rights-as-trumps turns 
constitutional litigation into a zero-sum game that tells the losers, “they have 
no rights the law is bound to respect.”31  He claims that American courts 
regularly follow Dworkin in devaluing the rights interests of the losing side with 
their strict scrutiny analysis of the government’s “compelling interest” or even 
scrutiny of the “rational basis” for laws abridging rights.32  
While Dworkin’s work is not responsible for the dominance of rights-as-
trumps in U.S. law, it philosophically epitomizes the difficulties with this 
framework.  Greene surveys how the “categorical” framework of American 
rights adjudication disconnects rights from justice by discounting many of the 
rights interests at stake in controversial cases such as Employment Division v. 
Smith,33 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,34 
District of Columbia v. Heller,35 and Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission.36  Either a baker has a right to refuse to bake a gay wedding cake 
as a matter of free speech that the government has no compelling interest in 
regulating, or he has no right to express his religious views in ways that 
discriminate against gay couples.37  Either the right to bear arms extends to the 
possession of handguns by mentally sane, individual non-felons outside of 
schools and government buildings in the District of Columbia, or these 
individuals have no such rights.38  And so on.  The possibility that interests 
 
 30 See Greene, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that the theory of rights-as-trumps does not obligate courts to 
treat interests in the same way as trumps; nonetheless, race-based affirmative action programs must 
be implemented more carefully than programs that categorize others on different grounds). 
 31 Id. at 79. 
 32 See Greene, supra note 2, at 56 (concluding that the categorical approach informs American 
constitutional cases); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 
1274, 1284–85 (2007) (providing a helpful survey of the origins of the tiers of scrutiny). 
33  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
34 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
35  554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 36 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 37 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (considering the proper reconciliation of at least two 
principles: the discrimination against gay persons and the right to exercise the freedom of speech and 
religion).  
38  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573 (considering whether the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the 
possession of handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment).  
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related to different just rights might conflict in these cases is apparently 
ignored.  Rather, these cases are discussed as evidence of an approach that 
“induces our identification of rights to track the categories judges are able to 
access, articulate, and delimit rather than the moral, political, or even 
constitutional justice the rights mean to promote.”39 
This “categorical” approach is contrasted unfavorably with the 
“proportionality” approach practiced by the Canadian Supreme Court in its 
analysis of Charter rights.  While Greene is admirably willing to discuss the 
shortcomings of proportionality analysis, he fails to adequately explain the way 
it devalues the substantive justice of the variety of rights interests it interrogates.  
The proportionality approach to rights devalues rights by reducing them to 
defeasible interests.  If Marco DeFunis had an interest grounding a right 
against unequal racial treatment by the law that could be balanced and 
overridden for the greater good, then it’s hard to see why this would better 
recognize the connection between that right and justice than Dworkin’s 
approach.  His rights-claim would be merely prima facie.  Both rights-as-
trumps and rights-as-proportionality appear to override DeFunis’ claim to a 
just right.  In truth, Dworkin’s account of rights-as-trumps may be much closer 
to the proportionality approach than Greene realizes.  This is because on 
Dworkin’s view, as Paul Yowell has adeptly shown, rights-as-trumps allow for 
balancing sufficiently important interests and thereby conceive of rights-as-
proportionate trumps.40  This raises the possibility that when Dworkin’s ideal 
of rights-as-trumps and other American cases devalue rights it is often because 
they share in the proportionality approach to treating rights as defeasible 
interests, albeit in a narrower fashion. 
It is important not to get too bogged down in philosophy.  Examples can 
help show how the rights-as-trumps or right-as-proportionality frameworks can 
devalue rights: Consider the similar way rights to the free exercise of religion 
are potentially devalued in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Employment 
Division v. Smith and the Canadian case of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony.41  In Smith, two Oregonian members of the Native American 
 
 39 Greene, supra note 2, at 32–33. 
 40 YOWELL, supra note 1, at 40–55. 
 41 See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990) (considering whether the Free Exercise Clause 
allows Oregon to criminalize peyote, even when it is consumed for religious reasons); Alberta v. 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.) (upholding a Canadian law that 
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Church were fired from their jobs with a private company because they 
ingested peyote for sacramental purposes.42  They were then subsequently 
denied unemployment compensation because they had been fired for 
ingesting a substance prohibited by an Oregon statute.43  The plaintiffs argued 
that this discriminated against their First Amendment right to freely exercise 
their Native American religion.44  The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the 
claim by interpreting the right to free exercise to not protect “otherwise 
prohibitable conduct” that is “accompanied by religious convictions” from 
“government regulation.”45  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that 
evaluating the impact of every regulation interfering with religious convictions 
in relation to the state’s “compelling interest” for doing so would be “courting 
anarchy.”46 
Greene thinks of Smith as a classic case of rights-as-trumps, where the 
messy job of balancing all of the rights interests at stake in free exercise claims 
is cut off with a rule restricting the category of cases where this right can be 
asserted.47  This devalues the rights interest of the two Oregonians seeking to 
freely exercise their religion by lumping it in with all manner of rights claims 
that would appear to require unreasonable exemption from civic obligations.  
But is the categorization of the plaintiffs’ interest as falling outside of the 
protection of the Free Exercise Clause really the reason why the Court 
devalues their right? 
Would the plaintiffs’ rights be any more “valued” if the Court had followed 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence by including their religious interest within the 
protected scope of the Free Exercise Clause, but then concluding that this 
interest was outweighed by the government’s interest in “preventing the 
physical harm caused by the use of a Schedule I controlled substance[?]”48  If 
the Oregonians’ rights claim has just value, as O’Connor reasons that it does, 
then the way she devalues the rights-claim is not by placing it outside the 
 
requires Members of Hutterian Brethren, against their religious beliefs, to have their photograph 
taken in order to hold an Alberta driver’s license).   
42  Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
43  Id.  
44  Id. at 878.  
 45 Id. at 882. 
 46 Id. at 888. 
 47 Greene, supra note 2, at 44–45. 
 48 Smith, 494 U.S. at 905 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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category of the protected right.  Rather, she devalues the rights-claim by placing 
it within the scope of the right, while treating the claim as a mere interest that 
can be overridden by interests lying outside of the scope of constitutional 
rights.  The counter-factual suggests that the real reason that the Court 
devalued the plaintiffs’ rights in Smith is that by setting their interest outside of 
the category of rights protection, the justices allowed a plausible rights-claim to 
be violated as one policy interest among others in the maelstrom of the 
“political process.”49 
The Canadian case of Hutterian Bretheren showcases how the 
proportionality approach can devalue rights in a similar, albeit perhaps more 
explicit, fashion.  The case involved Albertan Hutterites who objected to 
having their photographs appear on their driver’s licenses and sought 
accommodation as a matter of their right to freedom of religion under section 
2(a) of the Charter.50  Prior to a regulatory change, there was a photographic 
exemption for religious objectors.51  The Canadian Supreme Court’s majority 
decision categorized the new regulation as an “infringement” of religious 
practice protected by 2(a) of the Charter, but used the proportionality test 
developed in the landmark case of R. v. Oakes to assess the justification for 
the “limitation” of this right.52  The majority of the court held that the legitimate 
and suitable government aim of having a photo database lacking exceptions 
“minimally impair[ed]” the right, and that Alberta’s interest in the security of 
its licensing system outweighed any case-by-case harm to the religious freedom 
of individuals.53  The decision was highly questionable as a proper application 
of the  “minimal impairment” branch of the proportionality test, as the 
majority failed to establish why the photographs of 250 Hutterites were 
necessary to maintain a secure licensing system in a province with 700,000 
unlicensed citizens.54  But it also devalued the Hutterites’ right to religious 
freedom by treating it as a near inconsequential policy interest. 
This devaluation was not the result of the Canadian court’s categorization 
of the scope of the right, but rather a consequence of treating the right as an 
 
 49 Id. at 890. 
 50 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, para. 2 (Can).  
 51 Id. at para. 1. 
 52 Id. at paras. 35–108.  
 53 Id. at para. 62.  
 54 Id. at paras. 141, 143, 158 (Abella, J., dissenting). 
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interest worth less than the province’s interest in discouraging license fraud.  
The Canadian court categorized the regulation as an “infringement” that 
would “impose some financial cost on the community and depart from their 
tradition of being self-sufficient in terms of transport” in proportionality with 
the benefits of maintaining an “effective driver’s license scheme that minimizes 
the risk of fraud to citizens as a whole.”55  The Hutterites interest in religious 
freedom was outweighed by the province’s proclaimed interest in keeping 
down license fraud. 
Perhaps in anticipation of this critique, Professor Jackson has emphasized 
that there are reasons to doubt the “protective power” of the categorical 
approach to rights as it compares with Canadian proportionality reasoning.56  
Her point is not simply that the categorical approach to rights can fail to value 
rights, as on Greene’s critical view of Smith, but that the categorical stance 
invites devaluation when it makes exceptions to rules defining the scope of 
rights.57  She takes this lesson from the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent creation 
of exceptions to its free speech categories, particularly in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project.58  Humanitarian Law Project involved U.S.-based 
non-governmental organizations seeking to provide non-violent training in 
international law to certain terrorist groups, like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(or PKK) in Turkey, challenging a criminal statute prohibiting material 
support to groups designated as terrorist organizations.59  The statute was 
challenged as a content-based regulation as it applied to the kind of speech 
engaged in by the plaintiffs, but the Court nonetheless upheld the law due to 
the government’s compelling interest in combatting terrorism.60 
Jackson thinks that Humanitarian Law Project made an implicit exception 
to the Court’s Brandenburg v. Ohio strict scrutiny standard prohibiting the 
content-based suppression of speech inciting violence except when such 
 
 55 Id. at paras. 99, 101. 
 56 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137. 
57  Id. at 3139–41. 
 58 Id.; see also Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).   
59  Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. at 10.  
 60 Id. at 39–40; see also Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137 (“Concluding that the statute involved a content-
based regulation of speech [in Humanitarian Law Project], the Court nonetheless upheld the statute 
in light of the government’s interest in combatting terrorism.”). 
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speech incites imminent action and lawlessness.61  She notes that 
Humanitarian Law Project does not mention Brandenburg’s precedent, and 
reads the majority opinion as engaged in a less-stringent analysis of whether 
the statute was narrowly tailored to the purpose of combatting terrorism in 
ways that did not unnecessarily affect protected speech.62  Humanitarian Law 
Project is criticized for its alleged failure to clearly address whether national 
security statutes need to be less narrowly tailored to their purpose when they 
implicate free speech rights.63  This failure to explicitly address the balancing 
at work in developing an exception to Brandenburg’s rule defining the scope 
of speech rights against content-based suppression shows how the categorical 
approach can devalue rights by allowing them to be overridden, while doing 
so in a way that is less accountable.64  Jackson’s claim appears to be that while 
both the categorical treatment of rights-as-trumps and proportionality analysis 
can devalue rights by allowing them to be overridden, proportionality analysis 
allows courts to better protect rights by making the balancing of policy interests 
and rights more explicit. 
But notice that the devaluation of rights is built into the proportionality 
approach, whereas it is merely incidental to more categorical approaches that 
treat legal rights as absolute relations of justice.  This is the second conceptual 
point concerning how rights-as-proportionality compares to rights-as-trumps: 
rights-as-proportionality intrinsically devalues rights. 
Consider how the two conceptual approaches to rights compare in 
Humanitarian Law Project.  It may be that the Court’s approach to specifying 
its exception to Brandenburg in Humanitarian Law Project could have been 
clearer and more consistent, but it does not follow that this type of exception 
must involve the justification of suppressing speech rights.  Indeed, the 
majority opinion’s limitation of the protection afforded to speech coordinated 
with terrorist groups65 could be interpreted as specifying the rule in 
 
 61 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137.  In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969), the Court struck 
down a state statute on the grounds that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment.  In other 
words, the Court held that “speech believed to incite violence could be banned only when the 
speech’s character was an incitement to imminent action and likely to cause imminent lawlessness.”  
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137.  
 62 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3139. 
 63 Id. at 3140. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010) (“[T]he [relevant] statute is carefully drawn 
to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign 
groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.” (footnote omitted)).  
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Brandenburg in relationship to the unique uncertainty of when terrorist 
violence is imminent.  On this reading, Humanitarian Law Project does not 
quietly devalue rights, but specifies their scope in relation to specific 
circumstances.  It develops a new rule delimiting the scope of freedom of 
speech.  Of course, it also seems plausible that this specification could devalue 
speech rights because it is mistaken to think of speech that may support 
terrorist violence as unprotected; however, that is quite different from 
devaluing rights by doctrinally inviting courts to assess the proportionality of 
infringing the right to speech that supports organizations capable of imminent 
violence.  The former method can devalue rights by failing to properly specify 
rights in relation to history, precedent, and perhaps even some normative 
judgments about the scope of rights in particular circumstances, but the latter 
openly requires courts to consider whether rights are more or less important 
in certain cases. 
This contrast is also evident in Smith and Hutterian Brethren.  If Smith 
had categorized the Oregonian plaintiffs’ interest in using peyote within the 
scope of the right to free exercise of religion and then eschewed balancing, the 
right would not be devalued.  Treating rights as just trumps can devalue rights 
where judgments about the scope of rights are mistaken, but not when it 
properly categorizes rights.  Categorization can take on many different 
techniques of adjudication, but it does not itself devalue rights.  By contrast, 
even if Hutterian Brethren had been decided in favor of the Hutterites, the 
requisite balancing of this right as an interest at the “minimal impairment” and 
strict “proportionality” stages of the Oakes analysis raises the possibility that 
this right can be overridden at the discretion of judges.  This possibility 
devalues the right.  The Hutterites do not have much when they have a right 
to religious freedom.  They need a right and a judge who values that right. 
Of course, there are responses to this line of critique of proportionality 
analysis.  Both Greene and Jackson admit that there are problems with 
proportionality analysis and limits to the feasibility of its implementation in the 
U.S. context.  Nevertheless, both insist that rights are more valued in the 
Canadian world of proportionality analysis than the American realm of rights-
as-trumps. 
Greene’s main counter-argument is that while in some cases rights will be 
devalued by treating them as overridable interests rather than absolute 
relations of justice, the greater risk is that judges will make mistakes about the 
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scope of rights as absolute relations of justice.66  The reason that the risk of 
judges making mistakes about categorical rights is the greater threat is that the 
moral value of rights is subject to reasonable disagreement and judges are not 
equipped to resolve such disputes using “philosophical analysis or moral 
inspection.”67  This counter-argument fails because, as Professor Grégoire 
Webber has argued, it is perfectly consistent to think of rights as absolute 
relations of justice while also appreciating the existence of widespread 
reasonable disagreement about the absolute duties and obligations that flow 
from just rights.68  It is also reasonable to think these thoughts and conclude, 
as Webber does, that the logic of entrenching rights as supreme constitutional 
law requires judges to invalidate statutes that clearly violate rights, but defer to 
those subject to reasonable disagreement.69 
It is possible to agree with Greene that judges do indeed risk a great deal 
when they strike down enactments purporting to settle reasonable 
disagreements about rights, yet also think that judges conceptually devalue 
rights by treating them as overridable interests.  As Webber notes, it is 
necessary to distinguish conceptual arguments about whether rights can be 
overridden from arguments about which institutions will do the best job of 
overriding them or ensuring that they are not overridden.70  As such, Greene’s 
institutional argument doesn’t answer the charge that rights are conceptually 
devalued by reducing them to overridable interests—whether such reduction is 
the outcome of miscategorizing or balancing. 
Jackson’s main counter-argument is to point out how proportionality 
analysis is compatible with recognizing “‘core’ aspects of rights that are viewed 
as entirely non-abrogable and not subject to limitation by arguments from 
proportionality.”71  She points to examples of German and Israeli courts that 
make extensive use of proportionality analysis, but have also categorically 
 
 66 Greene, supra note 2, at 87–89. 
 67 Id. at 88. 
 68 See generally WEBBER, supra note 14, at 147–212 (arguing that democratic legitimacy requires 
treating the legislature as the central forum for the specification of rights subject to reasonable 
disagreement about the absolute but negotiable scope of their duties and obligations of justice). 
 69 Id. at 203–212. 
 70 See Grégoire Webber, Proportionality and Absolute Rights, in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW 
FRONTIERS, NEW CHALLENGES 75, 94 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2017) (“[W]hen it 
is concluded that legislation justifiably limits a right, legislation is to be understood as justifiably 
defining an underdefined right.”).  
 71 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3158 (footnote omitted). 
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struck down laws as wholly inconsistent with the value of rights to dignity and 
personal liberty.72  Furthermore, she notes that the ability of courts using 
proportionality analysis to exclude impermissible reasons governments offer 
for violating rights, as this helps shore up the judicial capacity to protect rights. 
This counter-argument is unconvincing because it appears to point to 
examples of courts eschewing proportionality analysis in favor of an absolute 
conception of rights.  It treats examples of absolute rights as evidence that 
proportionality reasoning can protect the value of rights.  What these examples 
show is that in rare cases courts have abandoned proportionality reasoning to 
protect just rights, which suggests that proportionality may not sufficiently 
protect the value of rights.  The result is that Jackson’s counter-argument fails 
to grapple with the main conceptual point that proportionality intrinsically 
devalues rights by treating them as defeasible interests.  Neither is it satisfactory 
to point to the ability of courts to exclude certain kinds of reasons for violating 
rights as a means of bolstering the ability of proportionality analysis.  Excluding 
reasons for violating rights is in some cases simply another way of defining the 
absolute limits on rights.  In cases where a reason for violating a right is 
excluded from reasoning about what should be done, the right’s demands are 
absolute in relation to that reason.  This protects rights by specifying their 
requirements. 
Of course, it is a related but separate conceptual question whether 
proportionality analysis provides a more transparent mode of reasoning about 
the nature of rights.  Transparency is the second virtue of rights-as-
proportionality, according to its proponents.73  In some cases, such as when we 
compare the way rights may have been devalued in Smith against the way they 
were devalued in Hutterian Brethren, it seems plausible to claim that having 
courts openly balancing the interests that justify overriding rights is more 
transparent than arbitrarily categorizing certain interests outside of rights’ 
protection.  Even if the approach in Hutterian Brethren intrinsically devalues 
rights, it may nevertheless do so more transparently than the categorical 
approach used in Smith.  The following Part will evaluate this claim. 
 
 72 Id. 
73 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142. 
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II. DISTORTED RIGHTS 
How does the American framework of rights-as-trumps compare with the 
Canadian framework of rights-as-proportionality when it comes to 
transparently tracking the full complexity of reasonable disagreements about 
rights issues?  Those who champion importing proportionality analysis into 
U.S. rights jurisprudence often claim that the Canadian approach promises to 
be more transparent.  Greene claims that rights-as-proportionality more 
transparently tracks the various interests at stake in rights disagreements, while 
rights-as-trumps obscures these interests and encourages judges to distort the 
meaning of rights to fit their judgments about how such interests relate to 
particular circumstances.74  For Jackson, the Canadian framework of rights-as-
proportionality promises a more “structured and transparent mode of reason-
giving”75 that can “provide a bridge between decision making in courts and 
decision making by the people, legislatures, and public officials.”76  To an 
extent, I agree with Greene and Jackson that American rights jurisprudence 
can inflate and confuse rights, but it tends to do so in an especially distorting 
fashion when it follows the framework of rights-as-proportionate-trumps.  
Indeed, the distortions of rights-as-trumps Greene and Jackson decry in cases 
such as Citizens United and Humanitarian Law Project are often traceable to 
proportionality oriented reasoning about rights as interests. 
In order to explain how rights-as-proportionality conceptually distorts 
moral disagreements about rights, it will be useful to show how the apparent 
distortions of rights-as-trumps can sometimes be traced to the concept of rights 
employed in proportionality judgments.  For Greene and Jackson, the 
tendency of U.S. courts to categorize rights in relation to different types of 
issues, agents, and circumstances distorts the empirical particularity and moral 
value judgments at stake in rights disagreements in favor of universal 
interpretive legal rules.  By contrast, they take the Canadian proportionality 
approach to promote more transparency and attention to the particular value 
judgments in rights adjudication. 
 
 74 See Greene, supra note 2, at 70–77 (relying on Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2239 (2015) to show that modern Supreme Court justices, who are rights-as-trumps jurists, will 
merely assert that a key right that the federal government is supposed to protect has been violated by 
the state, rather than embracing the rights-as-proportionality analysis). 
 75 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142. 
 76 Id. at 3144. 
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For example, Greene contrasts the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision 
about how restrictions on third-party campaign spending relate to the right to 
freedom of expression in Harper v. Canada77 to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
approach to this question in Citizens United v. FEC.78  Jackson focuses less on 
direct comparisons between American and Canadian cases, and argues that 
the “sequencing and defined order” of Canadian proportionality “enables the 
Canadian justices’ disagreements to focus on matters that are understandable 
by the parties as substantively relevant to the contested issue; such opinions 
also make accessible to readers the nature of the justices’ disagreement, and 
the divergent evaluations they may give to the same factors.”79 
This Part will argue that Greene’s comparison of Harper and Citizens 
United fails to properly track how proportionality judgments distort the rights 
at stake in both cases.  In turn, the distortions of Harper and Citizens United 
provide evidence that the kind of proportionality reasoning Jackson locates in 
American cases such as Humanitarian Law Project would not be rendered any 
less conceptually distortive by restructuring rights analysis along Canadian 
lines. 
Let’s first examine Greene’s discussion of Harper and Citizens United.  
Greene applauds the open judicial display of value laden policy judgments 
considering various interests in Harper.  In Harper, Stephen Harper, then 
president of the National Citizens Coalition lobby group and future Prime 
Minister of Canada, challenged provisions of the Canada Elections Act, 
including section 350’s restriction on third-party spending during a federal 
election to at the time of the ruling a maximum of $150,000 nationally and 
$3,000 in a given riding.80  He claimed that these restrictions violated the 
Charter right to freedom of expression (section 2(b)) and the right to vote 
(section 3), but the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court held that they 
“enhance” the right to vote and justifiably infringe freedom of expression.81  
The law’s restrictions on freedom of expression were found to serve the 
important interests of “promoting equality in political discourse” and ensuring 
 
77  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Can.). 
 78 Greene, supra note 2, at 40.   
 79 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142 (footnote omitted). 
 80 Harper, 1 S.C.R. at para. 3 (citing Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 350). 
81  Id. at paras. 66, 67, 146. 
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the “integrity” of campaign financing.82  The restrictions were rationally 
connected to achieving these goals, and minimally impaired political 
expression by limiting their restriction to “the commencement of the election 
period” and “preclud[ing] the voices of the wealthy from dominating the 
political discourse[.]”83  The values of equal political discourse and enhanced 
electoral fairness and accessibility were proportionate to the harm of 
preventing “unlimited political expression.”84 
Greene contrasts Harper with the U.S. Supreme Court’s subterfuge of 
categorizing the third-party spending limits challenged in Citizens United as 
identity-based restrictions on free speech.  Citizens United held that the First 
Amendment’s right to freedom of speech protects against the suppression of 
“political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”85  The case 
involved a non-profit corporation funded in part by for-profit corporations that 
produced and distributed a documentary film criticizing then-Senator Hillary 
Clinton while she was a candidate for President of the United States.86  The 
Court held that the impugned campaign finance law restricting the political 
expenditures of corporations and unions (the Federal Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act) discriminated against political speech on the basis of corporate 
identity.87  The government’s justifications for these restrictions—
“antidistortion,”88 “anticorruption,”89 and “shareholder protection”90— failed to 
demonstrate a compelling interest for the law under the strict scrutiny 
demanded by speaker-based restrictions. 
The contrast Greene seeks to draw between Harper and Citizens United 
is that Harper transparently balanced the particular interests at stake in third-
 
 82 Id. at para.104. 
 83 Id. at paras. 112, 118. 
 84 Id. at para. 121. 
 85 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
86  Id. at 319–20.  
 87 See id. at 341 (holding that “in the context of political speech,” the Government may not impose 
restrictions on disfavored speakers). 
 88 See id. at 349–56 (articulating the Government’s view that it can regulate a corporation’s speech when 
it would receive an unfair advantage). 
 89 See id. at 356 (articulating the Government’s view that it can ban corporate political speech because 
it prevents the appearance of corruption). 
 90 See id. at 361 (articulating the Government’s position that “corporate independent expenditures can 
be limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund 
corporate speech”).  
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party campaign spending, while Citizens United short-circuited this analysis by 
focusing “on the threshold question of whether the legal regime triggered strict 
scrutiny[.]”91  But these cases provide less of a contrast than a mutual exhibition 
of the distortions of proportionality analysis. 
Consider Citizens United.  Greene is correct to claim that the Court’s 
approach to rights in Citizens United distorts the real question at stake in the 
case.  As a matter of reasonable moral disagreement, American politicians and 
judges can be roughly divided between those who favor rights protections for 
both individual political expenditures and campaign contributions, and those 
who think both expenditures and contributions should be regulated.92  This 
moral policy disagreement is constitutionalized, because those who favor 
protections for expenditures and contributions argue that these rights can be 
found in the First Amendment’s free speech and press clauses.  Those who 
oppose these protections object to this legal argument.  The case of Buckley 
v. Valeo (which oriented the debate around these distinctions) upheld 
restrictions on contributions as a means of preventing corruption, while 
striking down certain limits on expenditures as “direct restraint[s]” on speech.93 
Citizens United affirms the constitutionality of limits on campaign finance 
but expands the protection for expenditures as a matter of a new interest in 
freedom from the suppression of speech based on the identity of the speaker.  
This is why the real question distorted by Citizens United is not “whether the 
speech being regulated is of relatively low or high value[.]”94  That would 
presuppose that expenditures count as constitutionally protected political 
speech.  As Michael McConnell has argued, the real question at stake in 
Citizens United was “whether a group outside the news industry is 
constitutionally entitled to disseminate to the public through mass 
communications media a commentary about a candidate for public office 
within a certain number of days before an election.”95 
 
 91 Greene, supra note 2, at 42. 
 92 See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 
412, 456 (2013) (“The distinction between contributions and expenditures survives in the Supreme 
Court only because the two sides are at odds about how to resolve it.”). 
 93 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21, 45 (1976). 
 94 Greene, supra note 2, at 40. 
 95 McConnell, supra note 92, at 422. 
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority actually starts off by appearing 
to inquire into the scope of the right at stake in the case, but it confusingly 
defines the right by treating it as an interest to be balanced.  The protection 
for speaker-based speech restrictions is extended by balancing the 
government’s anti-distortion interest against the interest in free political 
expression.96  Freedom from speaker-based speech suppression is defined as 
part of the right to free political expression, because the restriction of certain 
viewpoints can take the form of limiting what kinds of speakers can engage in 
political speech.97  The government discriminates against the identity of the 
speaker when it restricts the political speech of wealthy individuals, 
corporations, unions, and non-profits.98  Although media companies are 
exempted from the impugned restrictions, hypothetical limits on the 
expenditures of a wealthy media company would involve suppressing their 
political speech on the basis of their identity.99  This outcome is not only at 
odds with precedent, but the original meaning of the First Amendment would 
not “permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations.”100  The 
further inference is that freedom from speaker based restrictions constitute 
part of citizens’ interest in free political expression.  The inference is the key 
to how the right is hazily defined by balancing the value of the government’s 
interest in preventing distortion against a general interest in freedom from 
identity-based restrictions.  The Court concludes that the latter must prevail 
because if it did not it would jeopardize the higher value of freedom of speech. 
The majority opinion then moves on to balance the value of freedom from 
identity-based restrictions on political speech with the government’s interests 
in preventing “quid pro quo corruption.”101  The Court dismisses the 
government’s aim in preventing corruption as “[t]he anticorruption interest is 
 
 96 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (noting the government’s interest in anti-
distortion and the competing First Amendment interest in preventing the government from fining or 
jailing a group of citizens merely because of their political speech). 
 97 See id. at 350 (“The rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a 
necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression 
of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”). 
 98 See id. at 350–52 (noting that the Government cannot limit individuals’ or corporations’ political 
speech on account of their wealth). 
 99 See id. at 352 (arguing that the First Amendment prevents corporations’ political speech from being 
limited because they are classified as “wealthy”). 
 100 Id. at 353. 
 101 Id. at 359. 
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not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”102  It then evaluates the 
governmental interest “in protecting dissenting shareholders from being 
compelled to fund corporate political speech.”103  This interest is balanced 
against freedom of speech, but found to be an unacceptable reason that would, 
like countering distortion, “allow the Government to ban the political speech 
even of media corporations.”104 
My reading of Citizens United indicates how balancing rights as interests 
involves distorting moral judgments that distract courts from transparently 
specifying the legal scope and content of rights.  The way the Court treats the 
freedom from speaker-based restrictions on political expenditures as part of 
the protected interest in political speech allows its analysis to rely on the moral 
importance of freedom of speech.  The Court does not look to how the 
original meaning, precedent, or tradition concerning the Free Speech and 
Press Clauses define the right at stake.  It examines the reasons and means by 
which the interest in freedom from identity-based speech restrictions can be 
justifiably violated.  It finds that restrictions on the speech of certain speakers 
are justified due to “an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform 
their functions[,]”105 but few others match the moral importance of free 
political speech. 
But does allowing speaker-based restrictions on expenditures license the 
restraint of political viewpoints?  Against what standard do the justices find that 
the interest in freedom of expression is justifiably infringed by laws 
implementing government functions? 
These questions arise because the argument assumes rather than proves 
that what is at stake in the case is the right to be free from speaker-based speech 
suppression.  Those who reasonably question extending the scope of the right 
to freedom of speech to protect against most speaker-based regulations are 
caricatured as endorsing the state regulation of media expenditures due to 
their failure to sufficiently value citizens’ interest in speaking freely.  This newly 
minted right exposes long accepted restrictions on corporate and union 
campaign contributions as unjustifiable speaker-based restrictions,106 
mischaracterizes many good faith proponents of regulating independent 
 
 102 Id. at 357. 
 103 Id. at 361. 
 104 Id. (citation omitted).  
 105 Id. at 341 (citation omitted).  
 106 McConnell, supra note 92 at 449. 
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political expenditures as agitators for media regulation, and fails to account for 
the potentially distinctive freedoms protected by the freedom of speech and 
the press.  These are distortions of the disagreement between those who favor 
protections for third-party expenditures and those who wish to regulate such 
spending.  But Greene is mistaken to attribute such distortions to rights-as-
trumps.  They are the fruit of conceiving of the right against speaker-based 
speech suppression as an interest that cannot be proportionately trumped by 
laws advancing most other interests.  They flow from the very kind of value 
judgment Greene celebrates in Harper. 
This understanding of Citizens United contrasts with Harper’s outcome 
but largely mirrors its method.  Whereas Citizens United finds that speaker-
based expenditure restrictions violate citizens’ interest in freedom of speech, 
in Harper, the Crown “concedes” that its restrictions on individual third-party 
campaign spending “infringes” the Charter’s right to freedom of expression.107  
Citizens’ interest in freedom of expression is subsequently balanced against 
the “pressing and substantial” interests of “equality in the political discourse” 
among others.108  Restricting third-party expenditures is “rationally connected” 
to promoting egalitarian political discourse because unequal resources for 
purchasing advertising will enable the unequal influence of some “to dominate 
the electoral discourse[.]”109  The restrictions “minimally impair” freedom of 
expression because advertising is unlimited before an election period, there 
are “few obstacles” to citizens creating, joining, and contributing to parties, and 
advertisement unrelated to “a candidate or political party” is unlimited.110  The 
restrictions are “proportionate” because their “salutary effects[,]” such as 
promoting the “political expression of those who are less affluent or less 
capable of obtaining access to significant financial resources” trump the 
“deleterious effect” of not allowing third parties “unlimited political 
expression.”111  The interest in equal political expression trumps the interest in 
free expression. 
 
 107 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, para. 
66 (Can.).  
 108 See id. at para. 91 (noting that equality in political discourse is achieved by restricting participation in 
the electoral system for those with substantial financial resources). 
 109 Id. at para. 107. 
 110 Id. at paras. 112–14.  
 111 Id. at paras. 120–21. 
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Harper may be more explicit in its use of proportionality and arrive at an 
outcome more amenable to Greene’s judgment, but it distorts rights in the 
same fashion as Citizens United.  Justice Bastarache’s majority opinion in 
Harper concludes that citizens’ interest in freedom of expression is 
proportionately infringed by third party expenditures to promote equal 
political expression.112  Just as Citizens United assumes the rights interest it 
should prove, Harper assumes that third-party spending restrictions infringe 
citizens’ interest in freedom of expression even as its proportionality analysis 
appears to turn on the conclusion that promoting equality of “political 
expression” protects this interest.113  This oddly implies that third-party 
spending is protected by freedom of expression, but nevertheless should be 
infringed to serve citizens’ interest in equal political expression.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court thereby distorts the question of whether freedom of 
expression protects third-party expenditures by assuming that it does, but then 
reasoning that other interests related to political expression justify acting 
against this right. 
Citizens United and Harper are just two cases concerning a particular 
rights question, but they provide a sense of how the rights-as-proportionality 
framework can distort disagreements about the scope of rights into confused 
disagreements about the value of rights. 
Cases like Harper and Citizens United also suggest that Jackson is 
mistaken to place hope in fixing the kinds of distortion she finds in 
Humanitarian Law Project by restructuring American rights jurisprudence to 
more closely resemble the Canadian approach. 
Although Jackson has insightfully explored the way proportionality has 
played a role in doctrines concerning the Eighth Amendment and Due 
Process Clause,114 she joins Greene in advocating for the expansion of this role 
to achieve more transparent protections for rights.  I have argued that Citizens 
United can be read as collapsing the categorical approach into a 
proportionality judgment.  This resembles Jackson’s characterization of 
Humanitarian Law Project as a demonstration of how proportionality 
judgments can be disguised by the categorical approach.  The difference is that 
 
112  Id. at para. 146. 
 113 Id. at para. 120. 
 114 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3104–05. 
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Jackson goes one step further and argues that Humanitarian Law Project 
shows the inevitability of using proportionality judgments to make exceptions 
to categorical rules for defining rights.115 
As mentioned above, she takes this inevitability to show that critics of 
proportionality underestimate the way the categorical approach can devalue 
rights by overriding them.  She also thinks the inevitability of proportionality 
judgments means that rights will be better protected by making its exercise 
more explicit and subject to doctrinal rules.116  Proportionality analysis simply 
disciplines the inevitability of adjudicating conflicts between the interests 
related to rights in a more explicit fashion than the categorical approach.  But 
if rights can be devalued by proportionality judgments, what is it about making 
such judgments more explicit, as in Harper, that will better protect them? 
The problem facing Jackson’s argument is that the way proportionality 
devalues rights also distorts them.  Just as Citizens United and Humanitarian 
Law Project could be thought to devalue rights by balancing freedom of speech 
against other interests, they would then both distort disagreements about the 
scope of rights as disputes about the value of rights.  Citizens United distorts 
the question of about the scope of freedom of the press as a question about 
the value of the freedom from identity-based speech suppression.  
Humanitarian Law Project, on Jackson’s reading, takes the question of 
whether speech that could aid terrorist violence is protected by the right against 
content-based speech suppression and distorts it as a question about the value 
of free speech when weighed against the state’s interest in combatting 
terrorism.  The way Harper makes its value judgment about the 
proportionality of infringing freedom of expression explicit does not express 
the disagreement about how the scope of freedom of expression relates to 
third-party campaign expenditures any more clearly. 
It does not clarify a disagreement about the scope of rights to make their 
resolution “explicitly” turn on a judgment about their value.  To riff on a line 
from the late Justice Scalia, this a bit like insisting that using a measuring tape 
to weigh a rock would be more accurate than estimating its length with the 
 
115  See id. at 3139 (arguing that Humanitarian Law Project shows that during times of major security 
threats, courts tend to apply a “less stringent means-ends test of whether the prohibition [on free 
speech] could be said rationally to serve the government’s asserted interests”). 
 116 Id. at 3192. 
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naked eye.117  Breaking out a measuring tape is not going to help clarify a 
disagreement about how much a rock weighs.  It is going to confuse ordinary 
folks and rock specialists alike.  However, it is worth qualifying how this 
conceptual argument relates to more empirical claims.  It may be conceptually 
true that proportionality distorts rights; it is a separate question whether such 
distortions are in fact common or inevitable in American rights jurisprudence.  
The ways that U.S. courts often use doctrines to resist making proportionality 
judgments about rights helps underline why Jackson is mistaken to think of 
such judgments are inevitable. 
III. AMERICAN PROPORTIONALITY? 
So far, I have argued that the framework of rights-as-proportionality 
conceptually devalues and distorts constitutional rights.  However, this does 
not quite address Greene and Jackson’s institutional arguments for why rights-
as-proportionality promises to improve the way American institutions resolve 
disagreements about rights.  They not only claim that proportionality analysis 
can clarify the connection right and justice, but also that the institutional 
consequence of courts employing this approach will be a more democratic 
form of rights protection.118  In Greene’s words, incorporating proportionality 
analysis into American rights jurisprudence will help U.S. institutions better 
respect what he rightly cherishes and calls “a democratic people’s first-order 
right to govern itself.”119  Pointing out how rights-as-proportionality can devalue 
and distort rights does not directly address the institutional argument that 
proportionality can help American courts and legislatures resolve rights 
disagreements more democratically. 
This is partly because the conceptual devaluation and distortions of 
proportionality analysis could have varying effects on particular institutional 
and political contexts.  It is also partly a question as to what extent 
proportionality analysis actually informs the way American judges reason 
about rights under the tiers of scrutiny.  If proportionality judgments 
overriding rights are widespread, then this will could help undermine the case 
 
 117 Here, I draw on Justice Scalia’s famous declaration that balancing rights is like trying to decide 
“whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”  Bendix Autolite Corp. v. 
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
118  Jackson, supra note 5, at 3194; Greene, supra note 2, 128. 
 119 Greene, supra note 2, at 128.  
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for expanding its role in U.S. rights adjudication to more transparently value 
rights.  As such, before assessing how proportionality analysis can 
institutionally disrupt the American model of rights protection, it will useful to 
offer a rough sketch of the extent to which proportionality informs current 
doctrines concerning constitutional rights. 
This brief account does not follow the “hornbook sketch” of the tiers-of-
scrutiny framework where certain classifications and rights are matched to 
particular standards of review.120  As was the case in Citizens United, it is 
possible for supposedly categorical cases of strict scrutiny to rely on 
proportionality judgments to strike down laws.  On closer inspection, the 
concept of courts allowing the state to proportionately override rights appears 
to be as scattered across different doctrines and rights as the concept of 
avoiding such proportionality judgments by specifying the scope of rights. 
How prevalent is the disguised kind of proportionality judgment of 
Citizens United in American tiers of scrutiny analysis?  Although reading 
Citizens United as a proportionality case indicates that American rights 
adjudication may be less dominated by rights-as-trumps than Greene argues, I 
make no claim to properly answer the empirical question of to what extent 
supposedly categorical American cases collapse into proportionality 
reasoning.  This Part merely offers a brief sketch of the mixed record of 
American uses of proportionality.121  Some cases use the tiers of scrutiny in 
ways that eschew proportionality reasoning about overriding rights, while 
others appear to disguise such proportionality judgments.  American rights 
jurisprudence appears to be a mixture of rights-as-trumps and rights-as-
proportionality. 
There are clearly strands of American rights adjudication that treat the 
defined scope of rights as trumps.  In some cases, resisting proportionality 
takes the form of refusing to expand the scope of rights and leaving their 
definition to the political process.  We have already seen how, rightly or 
wrongly, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to balance the right to free exercise 
of religion in the majority opinion in Smith by holding that this right did not 
 
 120 Greene, supra note 2, at 46. 
121  Cf. SWEET & MATHEWS, supra note 5, at 97–119 (offering an alternative account of proportionality’s 
relationship to the tiers of scrutiny that differs from this Article’s but supports the basic claim that the 
record is mixed). 
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extend to “otherwise prohibitable conduct.”122  Another example is 
Washington v. Glucksberg, in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to 
recognize the right to assisted suicide in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.123  Instead, it insisted that fundamental rights must either be 
textually based or “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition[.]”124  This essentially constituted a move away from the balancing of 
due process rights, however tenuous it may have proven. 
Various constitutional rights have also been protected against balancing by 
judicial decisions defining the scope of rights using different doctrinal tests, 
including compelling interest analysis under strict scrutiny.  American judges 
have sometimes used rational basis review and strict scrutiny to define and 
defend the scope of different constitutional rights.  In rational basis review 
cases with bite, judges have sometimes justified striking down laws due to the 
relationship between certain groups and their right to equal protection under 
the law.  Such cases often involve judges’ sense that animus threatens the equal 
rights of groups such as hippies,125 gays and lesbians,126 short-term state 
residents,127 the mentally disabled,128 and others.  These cases might show 
evidence of the inconsistency of the tiers of scrutiny, but they also involve 
attempts by the Court to articulate how the scope of the right to equal 
protection of the laws shields certain groups from specific kinds of animus.  
These cases strike down laws for violating the equal protection of the laws from 
public policy rooted in prejudice.  This is arguably a haphazard way of defining 
rights, but it does not involve justifying the benefits of such laws against the 
“infringement” of an equality right. 
There are many strict scrutiny cases, in particular in free speech doctrine, 
that treat the scope of rights as a trumps.  Citizens United notwithstanding, in 
 
 122 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 123 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997). 
 124 Id. at 720–21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
 125 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532–34 (1973) (holding that the Food Stamp Act 
creates an irrational classification in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by 
intending to prevent hippies and hippie communes from participating in the food stamp program). 
 126 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (finding no rational basis for amendment to state’s 
constitution that would deny gays and lesbians the protection of antidiscrimination laws). 
 127 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56 (1982) (finding no rational basis for an Alaskan law 
distributing oil-revenues in an unequal fashion favoring long-term over short-term state residents). 
 128 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (finding no rational 
basis for permit requirement imposed on a home for people with intellectual disabilities). 
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modern free speech cases strict scrutiny has tended to exclude not only any 
governmental interest in suppressing speech based on its content or view-
point,129 but even the judicial assessment of the value of speech.130  Whether or 
not these rules properly delimit the scope of the right to free speech, they seek 
to define the scope of the right as freedom from governmental restrictions on 
expression on the basis of the moral value of speech. 
But proportionality style reasoning also permeates judicial reasoning about 
many rights.  In some cases, proportionality is openly used as a way of dealing 
with rights that appear to require historically evolving standards that can be 
applied across individual cases.  An example of this is found in the Court’s 
standard for scrutinizing the proportionality of sentences under the historically 
“evolving standards of decency” of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment.131  Proportionality judgments also openly 
appear under the Takings Clause in the heightened scrutiny given to how 
conditions on zoning permits relate to the effects of the planned usage of 
property.132  In at least one older case, the Supreme Court has even explicitly 
used the governmental interest in national security to justify upholding a law 
entailing the compulsory disclosure of an organization’s membership that it 
found “may in certain instances infringe constitutionally protected rights of 
association.”133 
Other cases and areas of law may come closer to the camouflaged 
proportionality analysis at work in Citizens United.  In some strict scrutiny 
cases, the Court asks whether the government has a compelling interest and 
 
 129 See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.” (citations omitted)); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) 
(same). 
 130 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech 
does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs 
and benefits.”). 
 131 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 132 See e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013) (explaining that 
the government cannot “condition the approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment 
of a portion of his property unless there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the 
government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 392, 398 (1994) (stating that the government must show a “‘rough proportionality’ between the 
harm caused by the new land use and the benefit obtained by the condition” (citation omitted)). 
 133 Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1961) (citation 
omitted). 
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minimally overrides a right, but disguises this as an empirical inquiry.  Paul 
Yowell has convincingly argued that this was the case in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association.134  Brown concerned a California law 
that prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors and whether that law 
suppressed speech in violation of the First Amendment.135  Justice Scalia’s 
opinion relied on his own review of empirical evidence to reject a submission 
by the state of California purporting to show a causal link between exposure 
to violent video games and psychological harm to children.136 
Proportionality judgments can also be disguised by historical reasoning 
about the original meaning of rights.  This is arguably even true of District of 
Columbia v. Heller, a case alternately celebrated and castigated (depending on 
whom you ask) for its majority opinion’s clarion call against the kind of interest 
balancing advocated by Justice Breyer.137  Heller joins Citizens United as one 
of the more controversial Supreme Court cases in recent history.  The case 
involved a five-justice majority opinion, penned by the late Justice Scalia, 
holding that the District of Columbia’s requirement that all firearms be 
disabled at all times and its ban on handguns violated the original meaning of 
the Second Amendment’s protection for citizens’ right to bear arms.138 
Heller does more than Citizens United to specify the scope of the right 
under consideration by making the historical case that the right to bear arms 
was meant to protect the natural right to self-defense.139  That is probably 
enough to show that requiring firearms to be disabled at all times violates the 
purpose protected by the right.140  But Justice Scalia’s denunciation of both 
legislative and judicial balancing is followed up by the claim that banning 
handguns violated the purpose of the right to bear arms because “the 
American people” consider “the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense 
 
 134 YOWELL, supra note 1, at 37. 
 135 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 788–89 (2011). 
 136 Id. at 800. 
 137 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“Like the First [Amendment], [the 
Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest balancing by the people—which JUSTICE 
BREYER would now conduct for them anew.” (emphasis in original)). 
138  Id. at 625, 636.  
139  Id. at 635. 
 140 See id. at 630 (concluding that, by requiring firearms in the home be inoperable at all times, it is 
“impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence 
unconstitutional”). 
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weapon.”141  That is not a conclusion premised on historical evidence.  This 
judgment seems to turn on the value of handguns as a means of serving the 
interest in self-defense, which Justice Scalia thinks would be disproportionately 
impaired by banning handguns.  Professor Nelson Lund has described this 
argument as potentially engaging in “covertly Breyer-esque judicial interest 
balancing[.]”142  This reading of Heller indicates that Citizens United might not 
be alone in masking proportionality reasoning under originalist pretensions. 
The foregoing sketch indicates that American rights jurisprudence has a 
mixed record when it comes to using proportionality analysis.  In some cases 
of strict scrutiny, proportionality is used to uphold or strike down laws; in some 
cases of rational basis “with bite,” categorical judgments are used to define the 
scope of rights as trumps.  A more in-depth analysis would trace the history of 
different uses of proportionality analysis in the development of the tiers of 
scrutiny under the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts courts,143 in the earlier 
period where Justice Black contested the balancing of rights,144 and even farther 
back in the substantive due process of the Lochner era.145  But a survey of 
current American rights doctrines shows that proportionality style reasoning is 
not a thing of the past, nor an unchallenged feature of the present.  The record 
is mixed, and this makes it difficult to say whether proponents of 
proportionality are correct to trace the institutional disruption of rights 
disagreements to right-as-trumps. 
In at least some cases, their claims appear to target rights-as-proportionate-
trumps; that is, they appear to trace the devaluation and distortion of right to 
proportionality style reasoning.  But it is difficult to say how widespread this is 
because one must look beneath the tier of scrutiny deployed to find out 
whether a court is using doctrine to balance or specify constitutional rights.  In 
turn, this makes it difficult to evaluate how institutionally disruptive the rights-
as-trumps or rights-as-proportionality frameworks might be in the American 
 
 141 Id. at 629. 
 142 Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1343, 1355 (2009). 
 143 See generally Fallon, supra note 32, at 1297–1302 (explaining that the general formula for strict 
scrutiny remained largely the same, but the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts courts added types of 
“intermediate scrutiny”).   
 144 See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 877–79 (1960) (stating that the 
balancing rights test gives the government too much power and ignores the already carefully balanced 
intricacies of the Constitution). 
 145 YOWELL, supra note 1 at 57–62.  
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context.  This renders the clear doctrinal usage of proportionality analysis in 
Canada a useful point of comparison for evaluating the arguments of 
proportionality’s American proponents.  In the following Part, I shall argue 
that Canadian style proportionality could institutionally disrupt the democratic 
resolution of disagreements about American constitutional rights. 
IV.  DISRUPTED RIGHTS 
At a glance, it might seem unfair to look to Canada in order to understand 
the impact of expanding proportionality analysis in the United States.  The 
Canadian model of rights protection is the object of much comparative 
adoration.  While the U.S. Supreme Court is usually the prime piñata for 
critics of the democratic credentials of judicial review,146 these critics have often 
been less willing, with some entertaining exceptions,147 to beat up on the 
Canadian Supreme Court.  This is partly due to Canadian courts’ use of 
proportionality analysis and partly a matter of the ability of the federal and 
provincial legislatures to enact laws “notwithstanding” judicial rulings on 
certain rights.148  Proportionality analysis is taken by some comparative scholars 
to help mitigate the democratic pathologies of judicial review across 
constitutional contexts.149  The open use of proportionality in the Canadian 
context is envied by its American proponents as a key ingredient in what is 
idealized as a more democratic model for protecting rights. 
But the comparison is at the very least useful because the mixed record of 
proportionality in the United States makes it hard to distinguish which cases 
employ this methodology.  The fact that Canadian courts openly use 
 
 146 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1348, 1650 
(2006) (arguing that judicial review of legislation is “inappropriate as a mode of final decisionmaking 
in a free and democratic society” and noting that critics attack judicial review in America). 
 147 See, e.g., JAMES ALLAN, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: STEPS IN THE WRONG DIRECTION 25–30 
(2014) (comparing and contrasting the Canadian Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
noting that the Canadian court has a number of differences, including selection process and lack of 
bicameralism, by which the author ultimately concludes that the Canadian court is less democratic 
than the United States court).  
 148 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 149 See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Proportionality and Democratic Constitutionalism, in 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 259, 270 
(Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller, & Grégoire Webber eds., 2014) (considering conflicts between 
two constitutional rights from within the culture of democracy perspective). 
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proportionality to justify “infringements” of rights, and Canada shares many 
constitutional features with the United States, makes comparing the two 
contexts instructive.  More controversially, the comparison is also fair because 
proportionality’s devaluations and distortions of rights disrupt the ability of 
Canadian institutions to democratically resolve disagreements about rights. 
Of course, it is important to note that American proponents of 
proportionality do not simply want to cut and paste the Canadian “Oakes test” 
into the U.S. context.  For example, neither Greene nor Jackson recommends 
uniting all rights analysis under one uniform Oakes style proportionality test.150  
Greene is also careful to write that in cases where there is no reasonable 
disagreement that rights are threatened by prejudice, rights-as-trumps should 
guide American rights jurisprudence.151  He also thinks the paradigm cases of 
American constitutional rights jurisprudence now concern “the potential 
overreach or clumsiness of a government acting in good faith to solve actual 
social problems[.]”152  Jackson is more circumspect, arguing that 
proportionality may not be appropriate for certain rights such as the First 
Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech,153 while benefitting others 
such as the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.154 
In spite of these caveats, Greene and Jackson both claim that reforming 
the various strands of U.S. rights adjudication to resemble Canadian 
proportionality doctrine will clarify rights disagreements and better value their 
connection to justice.  They both think that this will have the institutional effect 
of allowing courts and legislatures to resolve rights disagreements in more 
 
 150 Greene, supra note 2, at 60; Jackson, supra note 5, at 3166–67.  At a Stanford Constitutional Law 
Center conference on proposing amendments that would improve the U.S. Constitution, Greene 
advocated amending the Constitution to qualify all of its rights to “limitations justified in a free and 
democratic society.”  Jamal Greene, Professor of Law, Columbia University, Panel at “A Big Fix: 
Should We Amend Our Constitution?” at Stanford Law School’s Constitutional Law Center (May 
12, 2017).  This amendment drew on the exact language of section 1 of the Canadian Charter that 
the Canadian Supreme Court used in Oakes to characterize “limits” on rights as “infringements” 
justified by proportionality analysis.  I was fortunate enough to comment on and criticize this 
proposed amendment in light of the Canadian experience.  
 151 Greene, supra note 2, at 127–28. 
 152 Id. at 128. 
 153 Jackson, supra note 5, at 3168. 
 154 Id. at 3169. 
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democratic ways, while also better protecting rights.155  They join Justice Breyer 
and other comparative scholars such as Stephen Gardbaum in thinking that 
proportionality could help appease democratic skepticism about American 
judicial review.156  Unfortunately, scholars such as Greene and Jackson fail to 
fully appreciate how proportionality’s devaluation and distortions of rights can 
institutionally disrupt democracy by contributing to (a) rights inflation, (b) 
undermining the classic justification for rights entrenchment and judicial 
review, and (c) encouraging a pathological type of rights dialogue between 
courts and legislatures. 
A. Rights Inflation 
The proportionality approach inflates the moral currency of rights in 
democratic discourse.  This contributes to the institutional disruption of how 
courts, legislators, and ordinary citizens democratically deal with 
disagreements about rights.  Proponents of proportionality make the contrary 
case that it is rights-as-trumps that impoverishes political discourse by inflating 
constitutional rights.  For instance, Greene thinks that rights-as-trumps have 
been partly responsible for the dark “legal Guernica” of a hyperbolic and 
oversensitive politics of unreasonable disagreement.157  He claims this “dulls 
the constitutional conscience of political actors by refusing to account for the 
constitutional right of the community to embody its political vision in the 
law.”158  This is not new.  Mary Ann Glendon and others have long made 
similar arguments.159  But what Greene’s account of the “inflated” deontic 
moral value of rights fails to emphasize is how language inflating the value of 
rights can stoke politically unreasonable rights rhetoric by allowing rights to be 
overridden while expanding the scope and number of rights interests. 
 
155  Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142–44; see also Greene, supra note 2, at 60.  Greene argues for moving 
American rights jurisprudence in the direction of the Canadian emphasis on the “frames” of 
standards over rules, particularism over universalism, empiricism over interpretation, and 
justification over authority: “[t]he plea of this Foreword will be to move U.S. constitutional 
adjudication closer than it is now to the proportionality end of those frames.”  Id. 
 156 See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 149, at 260 (arguing that proportionality should enhance 
democracy). 
 157 Greene, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
 158 Id. at 65 (emphasis in original). 
 159 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that rights history in America has focused on individualism and liberty, 
but has failed to champion rights of the community). 
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It is hard to trace the effects of different conceptions of rights on popular 
political discourse and institutional reasoning, but it seems plausible to say that 
much of what Greene thinks of as the discursively pathological effects of rights-
as-trumps talk can really be attributed to rights-inflation.  While 
proportionality’s devaluation of rights is hardly the single cause for the inflation 
of rights, it has likely contributed to it. 
Proponents of proportionality argue that the way rights-as-trumps 
discounts many of the complex interests constituting moral disagreements 
about rights inflates the value of rights.  Rights are disconnected from justice 
by categorizing their protection for certain interests to trump and exclude the 
consideration of other reasonable and relevant interests.  According to 
Greene, this treats only some interests as valuable and incentivizes the “zero-
sum” approach to many American rights disagreements where rights are “on 
one side, bad faith on the other” and “conflict is reconcilable only at wholesale, 
and without mercy to the loser.”160  The inflated value of having one’s 
cherished interest christened as a “right” lowers the value of treating competing 
interests as reasonable. 
This lays the blame for the “zero sum” nature of rights questions on how 
the legal categorization of rights excludes and devalues interests reasonably 
related to such questions.  This account would actually entail the widespread 
deflation of rights, in the sense of a constitutional culture where rights are 
highly respected and rarely vindicated.  In truth, much of the rancorous and 
hyperbolic character of modern rights talk can, at least in part, be traced to the 
ready willingness to equate interests with rights and the explosion of the 
number and types of interests that can be thought of as rights.  These are the 
sources of rights-inflation.  And proportionality reasoning encourages both of 
these things. 
Equating interests with rights does not invite reasonable compromise but 
can instead embolden a rhetorical game that involves the denigration of 
conflicting interests—even interests closely identified with the rights in 
question.  Part I of this Article argued against Greene that rights are 
disconnected from justice not by categorization, but by treating rights as mere 
defeasible interests.  While almost any method of adjudication can devalue 
the justice of rights by mistakenly defining or applying a right, proportionality 
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analysis is distinguished by its willingness to treat rights as interests subject to 
interest balancing.161  It is also possible to conceive of rights as protecting 
certain interests, but without allowing such interests to be balanced once they 
have been defined in relation to the persons and acts they protect.  When 
rights are interests prone to being overridden and balanced, the true standards 
for evaluating which of the interests implicated in a rights dispute should be 
vindicated becomes largely a matter of judicial moral judgment.162 
In courts, this incentivizes litigants to convince judges to either identify 
their preferred interests with a right, or subordinate rights to their interests. 
Conversely, they must denigrate and tarnish relevant interests that are at odds 
with their own.  This is why the majority opinion in Citizens United 
concentrates on lecturing the dissent for not valuing free political speech rather 
than on explaining why the interest in freedom from speaker-based 
expenditure restrictions constitute part of freedom of speech.  Outside of 
courts, the all-or-nothing character of the moral disagreements can be 
encouraged by the idea that even interests thought to define the core meaning 
of rights, e.g. the right of newspapers to publish political criticism of the 
government as freedom of the press, can be overridden for the sake of higher 
interests.  In legislatures, the idea that rights questions involve balancing 
interests could paradoxically wash the hands of legislators of responsibility for 
rights because all reasonable legislation seeks to balance interests.  Why worry 
about overriding rights when courts assume that this is the business of most 
rights related legislation and adjudication? 
The hyperbolic, winner-take-all character of much rights rhetoric and 
argument may also be partly traceable to the proliferation of the number and 
scope of interests considered to be protected by rights.  Where rights interests 
are ubiquitous it becomes all the more important to assert the value of the 
rights interests one prefers and deny any merit to conflicting interests.  It is an 
open question of how much the judicial use of proportionality analysis 
influences or is influenced by the inflation of rights as commonplace interests 
in popular political morality.  But it seems likely that proportionality reasoning 
has some influence on political discourse, as it undoubtedly deflates rights by 
expanding the scope and number of interests they protect.  Greene himself 
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cites Kai Möller’s unabashed observation that a feature of proportionality 
analysis is “the increasing protection of relatively trivial interests as (prima 
facie) rights.”163  He also discusses the use of proportionality by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court to find that the “right to free development of 
one’s personality” under Basic Law’s Article 2(1)  protects “the feeding of 
pigeons on streets and in public places as an expression of love of animals.”164  
While this is only one case, it indicates how rights inflation can disrupt 
democratic rights discourse in a fashion similar to the way monetary inflation 
can upset an economy. 
The German Court justified the law restricting this right as a means of 
serving “the interest of the community as a whole” by preventing property 
damage while only exercising a “very limited interference with the freedom to 
exercise the love of animals.”165  Although Greene does not necessarily agree 
with this degree of rights inflation, he thinks it “useful . . . as a contrast dye” 
with the categorical approach.166  He notes that American courts would be 
unlikely to entertain such a right, as these kinds of claims only fall under 
substantive due process if they implicate fundamental rights involving 
“personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy”167 or essential to 
the American “scheme of ordered liberty”168 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”169  This restricts the number and scope of rights interests 
recognized by U.S. courts, and Greene thinks this orients American rights 
discourse towards its scorched earth trajectory. 
But isn’t a citizen challenging a local ordinance against feeding pigeons as 
a violation of her “right to develop her personality” a sign of a societal 
breakdown in good-faith reasonable disagreement about rights?  Arguing that 
a right to develop one’s personality by feeding pigeons should outweigh a 
community’s rules for protecting its property projects absolute value onto a 
right and denigrates reasonable interests related to it.  Neither a system that 
 
 163 Id. at 58 (quoting KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3 (2012)). 
 164 Id. at 57 (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 23, 1980, 54 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 143 ¶ 2(d) (Ger.)). Error! 
Hyperlink reference not valid. 
 165 54 BVerfGE 143 2(d).  All translations of German language cases are author’s own. 
 166 Greene, supra note 2, at 57. 
 167 Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015)). 
 168 Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010). 
 169 Id. (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767). 
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allows such frivolous and unreasonable assertions of rights to clog its courts’ 
dockets, nor a society that supplies such assertions is treating rights reasonably. 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s uses of proportionality analysis have 
stopped short of recognizing a right to feed pigeons in parks, and it has even 
admitted that “[t]here is no free-standing constitutional right to smoke ‘pot’ for 
recreational purposes.”170  In spite of that admission, the majority of the court 
went on to justify infringing the “liberty interest” of the recreational pot user, 
robbing their admission of its force.171  Justices Arbour and LeBel dissented 
because they judged that the societal interests advanced by the law 
criminalizing marijuana possession was disproportionate to the liberty interest 
of the smoker.172  Justice Deschamps also dissented on the grounds that J.S. 
Mill’s principle that only harm to others can justify infringing liberty is 
incorporated into the Charter principles of “fundamental justice,” and 
marijuana use merely harms the user.173  Assessing liberty as an abstract interest 
inflated the scope of the right to encompass smoking pot for recreational 
purposes. 
There are other examples where Canadian courts have used 
proportionality to puff up rights, even if only to override them.  Consider the 
question of child pornography.  Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
categorization of child pornography as outside the scope of free speech,174 the 
Canadian Supreme Court has used proportionality analysis to recognize the 
possession of child pornography as an interest protected by the freedom of 
expression.175  The court accepted the government’s proportionality 
justification for infringing this right and even claimed that “the possession of 
child pornography must be forbidden to prevent harm to children.”176  As 
Grégoire Webber et al. have noted, this inflates the idea of the right to 
freedom of expression to such an extent that for the court “there are 
 
 170 R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, para. 87 (Can.). 
 171 Id. at para. 89. 
 172 Id. at para. 280. 
 173 See id. at para. 295 (“[M]oderate use of marihuana is harmless.  Thus, it seems doubtful that it is 
appropriate to classify marihuana consumption as conduct giving rise to a legitimate use of criminal 
law in light of the Charter.”). 
 174 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982). 
 175 See R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, paras. 5, 27 (Can.) (balancing the limitation to freedom of 
expression against the harm that possession of child pornography can cause to children). 
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conclusive reasons for acting contrary to the right: for the legislature to respect 
the pornographer’s freedom of expression would be to act unjustly or 
unjustifiably.”177  This is one more example of how this approach has 
encouraged a confused rights discourse that has warped Canada’s ability to 
treat rights reasonably.  Of course, the mixture of rights-as-trumps and rights-
as-proportionality in the American tiers of scrutiny makes it more difficult to 
say whether courts have contributed to rights inflation in the United States.178  
But the link between Canadian and German uses of proportionality analysis 
and rights inflation is not encouraging. 
A healthy rights discourse, where political actors are responsible and 
electorally accountable for sorting out disagreements about rights, will not 
feature widespread attempts to elevate trivial interests above democratic 
decision-making.  When a central bank heedlessly prints money, prices can 
skyrocket, and people can become desperate to afford even basic items.  
Analogously, proportionality’s complicity in stretching and proliferating rights 
can act as a reason for the polarized desperation of rights-claims that are worth 
less due to their increased supply. 
B. Undermining Enumeration and Judicial Review 
Two important reasons why many critics of judicial review are uneasy with 
the entrenchment of bills of rights is that they fear that such legal rights will not 
settle most moral disagreements about rights,179 while inviting unelected courts 
to nevertheless use enumerated rights to reverse democratic settlements.180  
Courts treating rights as just trumps does risk reversing past democratic 
settlements to moral disagreements about the meaning of enumerated rights.  
However, treating rights as interests that are subject to proportionality analysis 
can unsettle moral agreements and compromises related to enumerated rights 
by reversing democratic settlements about unenumerated rights beyond any 
legal mandate for adjudication.  This undermines a key justification of 
 
177 GRÉGOIRE WEBBER ET AL., LEGISLATED RIGHTS: SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH 
LEGISLATION 38 (2018) (emphasis in original). 
178  Thank you to Dan Walters for helping to clarify this point. 
 179 See JEREMY WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, in POLITICAL POLITICAL 
THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 195, 211 (2016) (arguing that bills of rights do not resolve moral 
disagreements about rights). 
 180 See id. at 226–33 (arguing that judicial review of indeterminate rights is a less democratic decision 
procedure than a majoritarian one). 
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entrenchment and feeds rather than assuages the democratic fears of critics of 
judicial review. 
Moral disagreements about rights questions are complicated by 
constitutionally enumerated rights, as evidenced in Citizens United and 
Harper.  Where a right is not only subject to vigorous good faith moral 
disagreement, but also touches on rights enumerated in a constitutional bill of 
rights, legal arguments about the meaning of the relevant enumerated rights 
are inevitably pulled into the political sphere.  The most trenchant critics of 
judicial review go so far as to decry the very entrenchment of rights because 
they think this gravitational pulling of law into politics distorts moral 
disagreements about rights and grants courts undemocratic powers in resolving 
them.181 
The most influential argument along these lines holds that where there are 
basically functional democratic and judicial institutions, and where citizens 
engage in numerous good faith disagreements about rights left unsettled by a 
bill of rights, it will violate the right of citizens to an equal say in resolving such 
questions for an unelected court to determine the meaning of such rights as 
part of its interpretive task.182  Notice that presupposing that legally entrenched 
rights are indeterminate distinguishes this argument from the distinct 
Jeffersonian claim that even the judicial enforcement of the determinate 
meaning of entrenched rights generates inter-generational inequalities.183 
With Greene, we can accept the force of this argument without rejecting 
constitutional bills of rights and judicial review tout court.184  But our analysis 
of the rights devaluation and distortions of proportionality analysis allows us 
to see how it can exacerbate the difficulties pointed to by critics of rights 
entrenchment and judicial review.  Greene accepts the points scored by these 
 
 181 See generally RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 28 (2007) (arguing that incorporating a bill of rights 
can produce rather than restrain arbitrary rule). 
 182 See WALDRON, supra note 179, at 199 (arguing that judicial review is undemocratic because it 
privileges a small number of unelected judges to determine the final resolution of issues about rights 
and disenfranchises ordinary citizens).  
 183 See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 382 (Charles Hobson et al. eds., 1979) (considering whether one generation of 
men is entitled to bind another later generation of men). 
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critics, but then chalks them up as counting against rights-as-trumps.185  He 
claims that critics of judicial review should be placated by proportionality 
analysis because it addresses the interests at stake in rights questions directly, 
“rather than through the smoke of precedent and doctrinal formulae.”186 
Allowing judges to weigh rights as interests devalues even the clear meaning 
of entrenched rights by permitting them to be overridden.  As such, 
proportionality analysis erodes one of the conditions that could help justify 
constitutional judicial review: that it values and enforces the past democratic 
enactments of a political community. 
And Greene and Jackson’s hope that proportionality will transparently 
address the interests at stake in rights questions is betrayed by the way it distorts 
rights while allowing judges to control their meaning.  Proportionality analysis 
encourages litigants to present their disagreements about rights not as 
concerning the scope of any given right, but rather as what Jeremy Waldron 
calls a “rights-misgiving” about taking a right “to an extreme or applying it in 
cases where other important interests (for example, survival or security) are 
much more urgently engaged.”187 
This elevates courts to making moral and empirical judgments about the 
value of rights in public policy controversies without any direct accountability 
to citizens.  Those who object to Citizens United extending freedom of speech 
to protect against laws targeting speakers based on their identity are caricatured 
as insufficiently valuing free speech; those opposed to the restrictions on third 
party freedom of expression upheld in Harper are cast as insufficiently valuing 
equal political expression, or even seeking to dominate their fellow citizens.188  
In both cases, the courts rely on moral intuitions to interfere with a reasonable 
disagreement about the moral meaning of entrenched rights.189 
That reliance on moral intuitions pulls the rug out from Alexander 
Hamilton’s famous justification of judicial independence in relation to the 
“knowledge of the laws” possessed by judges.190  One does not rely on 
 
 185 See id. (“[R]ights as trumps front-loads questions of rights definitions that judges . . . address 
mechanistically.”). 
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 187 Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 
(2d) 7, 17–18 (2004). 
188  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, para. 107 (Can.). 
189  Id.; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010). 
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knowledge of law to assess whether restrictions on third-party spending 
justifiably infringe the right to freedom of expression.  The judgment that a 
right can be justifiably infringed is at least partly a moral one, although it’s 
unclear what moral standard renders the different interests at stake in such 
disagreements commensurable.191  It is difficult to democratically justify the 
shielding of such moral judgments by constitutional independence, as there is 
no reason to think that judicial judgments about the moral value of freedom 
of speech or equal political expression deserve to be privileged over those of 
zookeepers, librarians, or any other societal role.  This also arbitrarily 
privileges the powers of whichever side or faction of a rights disagreement 
shares relevant moral values with a majority of the court.192 
This problem will not comfort the critic of judicial review.  On the 
contrary, it ought to contribute to democratic skepticism about entrenching 
rights that are subject to judicial proportionality analysis. 
C. Interrogative Dialogue 
In response to these arguments, proportionality’s American fans might 
reply that it allows for the renegotiation of rights commitments made in the 
past through a democratic kind of “dialogue” between courts and legislatures.  
This strand of thinking could rely on the distinct premise that even if legal 
rights could settle and guide moral rights disagreements, the constriction of 
entrenched legal rights in the past suppresses the equal right of living citizens 
to settle their disagreements in the present.  On this argument, rights inflation 
could be limited by sensible proportionality judgments about rights made by 
interactive negotiations between courts and legislatures, and these negotiations 
could democratically free citizens from the grip of rigid commitments made 
by past generations.  Or perhaps Greene and Jackson might contend that 
moral disagreement about the meaning of rights extends radically to the 
methods for interpreting their meaning, such that rights must be continually 
renegotiated in dialogues between courts and legislatures about their present 
value. 
 
 191 See FRANCISCO J. URBINA, A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING 46–74 (2017) 
(explaining the incommensurability objection to proportionality). 
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Either argument would appear to follow the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
suggestion in cases such as R. v. Mills,193 Vriend v. Alberta,194 Sauvé v. Canada 
(Chief Electoral Officer),195 and even Chief Justice McLachlin’s dissent in 
Harper,196 that legislative replies to judicial decisions create a “dialogue 
between and accountability of each of the branches [to one another]” that has 
“the effect of enhancing the democratic process[.]”197  The problem with this 
counter-argument is that proportionality analysis encourages what I have 
argued elsewhere is an undemocratic interrogative type of rights dialogue.198 
The general promise of dialogue is that it will allow legislatures to respond 
to judicial decisions, and courts to further review such replies, and so on, such 
that rights are democratically negotiated and protected by both legislation and 
adjudication.199  Proportionality analysis orients courts to interrogate legislative 
reasons and means for violating rights rather than reviewing the consistency of 
laws with the scope and nature of rights.200  In turn, this could orient legislatures 
and citizens influenced by judicial decisions to an inflated understanding of 
rights as interests.  Because courts using proportionality categorize most 
legislative enactments as justified or unjustified “infringements,” this could 
encourage legislatures to get in the habit of infringing rights.  It could also 
become natural for citizens to get in the habit of electorally holding their 
legislatures accountable for justifiably or unjustifiably infringing rights.201  
Interactions between elected legislatures and unelected courts will resemble 
interrogations about a criminal’s reasons for breaking the law rather than the 
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whether or not the law was broken.202  The legislature is “presumed guilty until 
proven utilitarian.”203  Insofar as such rights disagreements become election 
issues, the citizens will be habituated to voting about whether the governing 
political parties in the legislature unjustifiably violated or justifiably infringed 
rights.  The effect of dropping questions of the scope of rights from 
jurisprudence could contribute to erasing such questions from the democratic 
process. 
It may be that the moral value of entrenched rights should be up for 
renegotiation.  Alternatively, it could be true that moral disagreement clouds 
the ability of methods of adjudication to guide moral disagreements about 
rights.  Either way, it does not follow that courts will protect democracy by 
renegotiating rights in this interrogative fashion.  In either case, enabling courts 
to interrogate the reasons and means by which legislatures may override rights 
could discourage legislative and popular concern for renegotiating the scope 
and nature of rights.  This is because negotiating the value of rights, even in 
the face of moral disagreement about the methods of interpreting their legal 
meaning, presupposes the need for some degree of legislative control over 
their scope and nature.  We cannot democratically renegotiate the value of a 
right if we don’t care for what the scope of that right is.  And as discussed 
above, proportionality analysis will orient legislatures to negotiate misgivings 
about the value of rights rather than disagreements about the scope of rights.  
This undemocratically cedes control of the scope of rights to unelected courts 
and corrupts rights disagreements. 
Of course, legislatures may end up articulating judgments about the scope 
of rights when they are mischaracterized as contesting judicial value judgments 
about the proportionate “infringement” of rights.  And it also seems plausible 
that factors other than proportionality analysis are responsible for discouraging 
legislatures from articulating their own judgments about the scope of rights.  It 
may be that what really gets in the way of legislatures articulating the scope of 
rights are complex rules of standing, precedent, res judicata, or the basic idea 
that articulating the scope of constitutional rights falls to the adjudicative 
function.  These considerations do not change the truth that framing legislative 
replies to judicial decisions as justified infringements of rights can make it 
more difficult for legislatures to articulate their own views about the scope of 
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rights.  In the distorting light of judicial decisions using proportionality analysis, 
disagreements with courts about the scope of rights will be cast as objections 
to rights themselves, sometimes even by factions within the coalitions 
controlling the legislature.  Even if variables such as rules of standing, 
precedent, res judicata, and respect for the judicial authority over the scope of 
constitutional rights are the primary obstacles to legislative participation in 
rights dialogues, there is reason to think that proportionality analysis can 
compound these difficulties.  This feature of proportionality analysis can be 
discerned across both the Canadian and American contexts. 
The comparison of Canadian and American rights jurisprudence is once 
again instructive.  Basic features of Canadian constitutionalism appear to 
reduce the ability of variables other than proportionality analysis to obstruct 
legislative articulations of rights at odds with prior judicial decisions.  Although 
it shares something like the American state action doctrine,204 compared to the 
United States, Canada has a much looser standing regime for rights claims, 
lacks a political question doctrine,205 and its supreme court is comparatively 
less strict about precluding re-litigated rights claims under stare decisis and res 
judicata.206  Politically, the federal Canadian Senate lacks the democratic 
legitimacy of the U.S. Senate, and the provincial legislatures are unicameral, 
making laws easier to pass in response to controversial judicial decisions.207 
Yet in spite of what looks like a more welcoming constitutional 
environment for legislative participation in dialogues about the scope of rights, 
there is evidence suggesting that proportionality analysis has discouraged such 
dialogue.  Even in cases where Parliament appears to articulate its own 
understanding of rights, proportionality appears to exacerbate the difficulties 
it faces in doing so.  Conversely, there are American uses of right-as-trumps 
that appear to have encouraged more robust Congressional articulations of 
 
 204 See RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 574 (Can.) (“The Charter does not 
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constitutional rights.  This is in spite of the features of American 
constitutionalism that might present greater obstacles to such constructive 
responses.  And in the case of at least one such prominent response, the U.S. 
Supreme Court seems to have used proportionality analysis to help shut down 
a more constructive rights dialogue. 
Consider a recent Canadian example.  The Parliament of Canada arguably 
contested the understanding of the Charter rights to life, liberty, and security 
of person animating the supreme court’s invalidation in Carter v. Canada 
(Attorney General) of criminal restrictions on aiding and abetting assisted 
suicide.208  In Carter, the court invalidated these restrictions as violations of the 
right to life, liberty, and security of person “insofar as they prohibit physician-
assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the 
termination of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition 
. . . that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the 
circumstances[.]”209  This standard was explicitly tied to the circumstances of 
the plaintiffs in Carter,210  and Parliament and the provincial legislatures were 
invited to respond “should they so choose, by enacting legislation consistent 
with the constitutional parameters set out in these reasons.”211  Parliament 
eventually took up this invitation with a bill that restricted access to medically 
assisted dying to consenting adult patients whose “natural death has become 
reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances” 
and are “in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability[.]”212 
The evidence from the preamble to the bill, debate in the House of 
Commons and the Minister of Justice’s “Charter statement” on the rights 
consistency of its bill all suggest that the government sought to restrict the 
scope of the right to die to protect the rights of underage, disabled, elderly, 
and other vulnerable persons, and to generally prevent suicide.  The 
enactment’s conditions were arguably more restrictive than the court 
envisioned, and constitutional experts were quick to claim that, in not 
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conforming to the court’s decision, the government’s legislative proposal was 
inconsistent with the Charter.213 
In the face of these objections, the Minister of Justice, Jody Wilson-
Raybould, emphasized that judicial understandings of rights are not final as  
“nobody has a monopoly on interpreting the Charter[.]”214  She signaled her 
support for Parliamentary autonomy in specifying the scope of Charter rights 
by remarking that: 
it falls to Parliament not only to respect the court’s decision, but also to listen 
to diverse voices and decide what the public interest demands. It is never as 
simple as simply cutting and pasting the words from a court’s judgment into a 
new law.215 
Canadian legal scholars such as Dennis Baker are correct to characterize 
the government’s legislative proposal as an independent legislative articulation 
of the scope of rights.216  What such arguments miss is how the judicial use of 
proportionality analysis in Carter was used to characterize any deviation from 
the judicial scope conditions on the right to die as a violation of the right itself.  
Indeed, this contributed to the attempted political sabotage of the provisions 
of the bill reflecting Parliament’s independent judgment on the scope of the 
right to assisted suicide.  Once the initial bill passed to the Senate, the Liberal 
Senator Serge Joyal noted that the government’s bill was “an initiative to limit 
the class of people who have received the right according to the Supreme 
Court to resort to medical assistance in dying.”217 
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(medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament (2016) (statement of Peter W. Hogg, a 
prominent constitutional expert, arguing that Bill-C-14 attempted to establish a limitation to the right 
granted in Carter that was inconsistent with the ruling itself); 150(50) DEBS. OF THE S., 1st Sess., 42nd 
Parliament, at 1135–36 (June 15, 2016) (statement of Hon. Claudette Tardiff arguing that since the 
goal of medically assisted death was compassion, Bill C-14 was too restrictive), 
https://sencanada.ca/en/speeches/speech-by-senator-serge-joyal-during-the-third-reading-of-bill-c-14-
medical-assistance-in-dying-amendment-joyal/. 
 214 148(55) H. OF COMMONS DEBS., 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament, at 3310 (May 13, 2016) (statement of  
Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould). 
 215 148(45) H. OF COMMONS DEBS., 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament, at 2581 (Apr. 22, 2016) (statement of 
Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould).  
 216 Dennis Baker, A Feature, Not a Bug: A Coordinate Moment in Canadian Constitutionalism, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 198, at 397, 397. 
 217 150(45) DEBS. OF THE S., 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament, at 935 (June 8, 2016) (statement of Hon. Serge 
Joyal). 
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The unelected Senator’s rhetoric used proportionality analysis to reject 
narrowing the scope of the right to die because, in Carter: 
[t]he court was already seized with an allegation from the lawyers of the 
government that the prohibition for everyone not to have access to medical 
assistance in dying could be saved . . . to protect the vulnerable, to enhance 
the sanctity of life, to prevent suicide . . . objectives of social policies that are 
certainly sound but that are too broad to deprive a person who is adult, 
competent, in a grievous and irremediable health condition and suffers 
intolerably from having access to medical assistance in dying.218 
Senator Joyal’s reasoning shows how proportionality can orient what 
should be debates about the scope of a right towards a debate about the 
justification for depriving citizens of a right.  Those who supported the 
government’s bill were forced to defend its specifications of who should have 
the right to medically assisted dying as contesting the permitted reasons for 
infringing this newly discovered right. 
The Senator used the court’s proportionality judgment to convince a 
majority of his Senate colleagues that Parliament could not consider interests 
such as suicide prevention in crafting its response to Carter without violating 
the newly discovered constitutional right to assisted death.  The Senate sent a 
version of the bill without the impugned conditions back to House.219  
Although the Senate’s amendments were rejected and the House’s version of 
the bill was eventually enacted, it is quite striking that, even in the case of a bill 
meant to enact a novel right articulated by a supreme court overturning its own 
precedent,220 political factions of a governing party managed to use the language 
of proportionality to characterize the prospective law as a violation of that right. 
Overall, the Canadian experience indicates that interrogative dialogue 
reduces the chance the legislators and their voters will contest the scope limits 
and valuations judges place on rights using proportionality analysis.  This is 
partly because of the way proportionality-based decisions empower minority 
political factions to sabotage legislative responses to judicial decisions as in 
Carter, but also because legislatures generally have little appetite for appearing 
to contest judicial valuations of rights.  The federal and provincial legislatures 
have only rarely responded to judicial decisions invalidating their statutes as 
 
 218 Id. at 938. 
 219 Id. at 939. 
 220 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 521–22 (Can.). 
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unjustified infringements of Charter rights.221  And unlike American 
legislatures, section 33 of the Charter grants them the ability to formally 
insulate their legislation from judicial invalidation for renewable periods of five 
years. 
Critics of judicial review have tended to blame the reluctance of Canadian 
legislatures in using the notwithstanding clause on the widespread perception 
that laws invoking section 33 override Charter rights.222  The thought is that this 
forces legislatures that disagree with judicial decisions “to pretend to be 
brushing rights aside, whereas it might want to say that it is brushing aside 
mistaken interpretations of rights.”223  What these critics fail to appreciate is 
how the Canadian proportionality approach to rights developed in Oakes 
turns even most ordinary statutes into “infringements” of rights.224  Canadian 
judges have combined their understanding of dialogue with proportionality to 
uphold legislation that comports with their values, but rarely to countenance 
real disagreement. 
How does this compare to the American context?  It may be implausible 
to say that a more democratically constructive form of dialogue informs 
interactions between American courts and legislatures about rights.  Certainly, 
both the U.S. and Canadian Supreme Courts make occasional institutional 
claims to be the exclusive interpreter of constitutional rights.225  In both 
contexts, these claims of supremacy are at odds with the potential for dialogues 
between the branches that construct the scope of rights.  However, there are 
American legislative responses to judicial decisions where rights-as-trumps 
appears to have encouraged the legislative construction of rights.  Conversely, 
proportionality style reasoning appears to have contributed to judicial attempts 
to shut down rather than engage with such legislative constructions. 
 
 221 See Emmett Macfarlane, Dialogue or Compliance? Measuring Legislatures’ Policy Responses to 
Court Rulings on Rights, 34 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 39, 47 (2012) (determining that the legislature only 
responds with genuine dialogue in 17.4% of cases where a judicial decision finds that the legislature 
has unjustifiably infringed upon Charter rights). 
 222 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 187, at 34–39. 
 223 Id. at 38. 
 224 Id. at 34–39 (failing to mention how proportionality incentivizes understanding Canadian statutes as 
rights misgivings). 
225 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (per curiam) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme 
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 
3 S.C.R. 519, para. 17 (Can.) (discussing that the court should not defer to Parliament’s interpretation 
of the Charter as “part of a dialogue”). 
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Consider the legislative response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1990 refusal 
in Smith to find rights to the free exercise of religion in “otherwise prohibitable 
conduct” motivated by religious convictions.226  The Court was clear that it 
preferred to leave the protection of such rights to the political process.227  
Congress responded in 1993 with a law, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“RFRA”), that enacted federal statutory protections requiring the 
government to justify burdens it imposes on religious exercise as the “least 
restrictive” fashion and to further a “compelling governmental interest.”228  
These requirements were essentially statutory protections for the more 
substantive understanding of the scope of the Free Exercise Clause rejected in 
Smith.229  They applied to the federal government, but also to the states 
pursuant to Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to “enforce” the Amendment by passing “appropriate legislation.”230 
The Congressional deliberations about RFRA were explicitly critical of the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize a more substantive right to religious free 
exercise.231  Both the Senate and the House exhibited open criticism of Smith 
as a mistaken interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that would leave many 
important religious practices open to interference by formally neutral laws and 
regulations.  For instance, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary heard 
testimony regarding how Smith entailed the constitutionality of facially neutral 
 
226 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
227  Id. at 890. 
 228 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 229 Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 153, 161 (1997). 
 230 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 231 See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1–2 (1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (criticizing the elimination of the 
“compelling interest test” that required stronger justification by the Government in order to interfere 
with the free exercise of religion); Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before 
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 33–
34 (1992) (statement by Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel, on behalf of U.S. Catholic Conference) 
(arguing that while the “compelling interest test” was not a “panacea” for religion, the implications in 
abrogating from that test nonetheless loom large for religious institutions); Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 49 (1991) (statement by Rev. John H. Buchanan, Jr., 
Chairman, People for the American Way Action Fund) (“We are united in support of this legislation 
because it seeks to protect the fundamental principle of religious freedom, which was indeed 
undermined by the Supreme Court in the Smith decision.”). 
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laws requiring autopsies over the religious objections of animist and Jewish 
families,232 the use of neutral zoning laws to close down churches,233 neutral 
rules withdrawing the accreditation of residency programs in Catholic hospitals 
that refuse to perform abortions on religious grounds,234 etc.  Congress took 
up Justice Scalia’s challenge by weighing what he referred to in Smith as the 
“social importance” of ordinary laws with the “centrality of religious beliefs” to 
conclude that protecting the full scope of the right to free exercise was more 
important than maintaining the full enforcement of social policies.235  RFRA 
arguably exemplified a quintessential legislative judgment about the value of 
the policy discretion that would be displaced by fully protecting the scope of a 
right while directing courts to the quintessential adjudicative task of applying 
the scope of that right on a case-to-case basis.236 
As we shall see, the Supreme Court’s reaction to RFRA was antithetical to 
constructive dialogue.  Even so, RFRA itself can be understood as a legislative 
construction of the right to free exercise that was spurred by a judicial refusal 
to engage in proportionality analysis.  Congress was likely emboldened by 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit authorization to 
“enforce” the rights it incorporates against the states by “appropriate 
legislation.”237  Whereas debates in the Canadian Parliament about Carter were 
framed by its language as concerning whether limits on state-funded medically 
assisted dying were proportionate infringements of the right to die, the 
response to Smith involved robust disagreement with the Court about the 
scope of the right to the free exercise of religion.  Scalia’s refusal to balance 
rights in Smith238 resulted in Congress taking responsibility for extending the 
scope of the right to religious free exercise as a trump to be applied across 
individual cases by courts.  To be sure, the contrast cannot be wholly attributed 
to the Canadian Supreme Court’s use of proportionality analysis in Carter and 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to balance right in Smith.  But it does suggest 
 
 232 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
102d Cong. 9 (1992). 
 233 Id. at 64. 
 234 See id. at 72 (noting testimony of Prof. Douglas Laycock (citing St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. 
Supp. 319, 319 (D. Md. 1990))). 
 235 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 236 McConnell, supra note 229, at 192. 
237 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
238   Smith, 494 U.S. at 889. 
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that understanding rights-as-trumps may not be as inimical to constructive 
dialogue as proponents of proportionality might think. 
What happened after RFRA indicates why it is implausible to say that 
American courts and legislatures robustly engage in democratic and 
constructive dialogues about rights.  However, once again proportionality style 
reasoning played a role in undermining such dialogue.  For a period, litigation 
under RFRA allowed a number of successful free exercise claims against laws 
and regulations that might have been upheld under Smith.239  But government 
defendants soon challenged the constitutionality of the RFRA as it applied to 
state and local governments.  One of these challenges, Flores v. City of Boerne 
(pronounced “Bernie”), arose from a suit filed by the Catholic Archbishop of 
San Antonio on behalf of a church contesting the City’s refusal to approve any 
remodeling plan that would damage the church building.240  The district court 
ruled RFRA to be an unconstitutional violation of “the doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers by intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary.”241  
The case made its way to the Supreme Court solely on the question of the 
constitutionality of RFRA, and in a 6-3 majority opinion by Justice Kennedy 
the Court held the law unconstitutional as it applied to state and local 
governments.242 
The majority opinion in Flores combined a proportionality judgment with 
a raw assertion of judicial supremacy.  It held that the application of Congress’ 
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause to state and local governments 
violated the separation of powers and federalism.243  The Court framed the 
choice concerning Congress’ exercise of the Section 5 power as either allowing 
 
 239 See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467–70 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (holding that the EEOC’s and plaintiff’s claims against Catholic University were barred by the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and by RFRA); W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning 
Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544–46 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that plaintiff Church’s program was 
religious conduct falling within the protections of the First Amendment and RFRA); Bessard v. Cal. 
Cmty. Colls., 867 F. Supp. 1454, 1462–65 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that requiring plaintiffs to take 
an oath that violates their religious tenets as a condition to being considered for public employment 
violates their right to free exercise); Porth v. Roman Cath. Diocese, 432 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that RFRA bars the application of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act to defendant’s 
conduct). 
 240 Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 241 Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 357 (W.D. Tex. 1995). 
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substantive power by which congressional majorities could change the 
Constitution,244 or remedial power, by which Congress can enact mechanisms 
such as causes of action, fines, etc., to “prevent, as well as remedy, 
constitutional violations” exclusively defined by the Court.245 
The Court then relied on dubious history246 about the reconstruction era 
to affirm the remedial view and reject the substantive understanding of Section 
5.247  This historical justification of the remedial view eschewed any discussion 
of a middle ground between allowing Congress to change the Constitution, or 
restricting it to remedying violations of rights as interpreted by the Court.248 
The Court used this remedial view to treat RFRA’s disagreement with Smith 
about the scope of free exercise rights as an attempt to enact “a substantive 
change in constitutional protections.”249  RFRA was then assessed for whether 
the means by which it prohibited state action to remedy or prevent 
unconstitutional state action “was proportionate.”250  The statute was found to 
be disproportionate for targeting neutral state laws that would have been 
upheld under Smith,251 for the lack of evidence of widespread religious 
discrimination it was supposed to remedy,252 and for the burdens it placed on 
traditional state functions.253 
Jeremy Waldron has provocatively characterized the kind of “dialogue” 
exemplified by Flores as analogous to Ring Lardner’s dialogue from The 
Young Immigrunts: 
Are you lost daddy I arsked tenderly 
Shut up, he explained.254 
This captures the Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy in the place of 
any attempt to grapple with the possibility that Congress could be correct as a 
 
 244 Id. at 529. 
 245 Id. at 517. 
 246 See McConnell, supra note 229, at 176, 183 (arguing that the legislative history relied on by the City 
of Boerne v. Flores Court supports only that “Congress was not intended to have authority to pass 
general legislation determining what the privileges and immunities of citizens should be”) 
 247 Flores, 521 U.S. at 520–24. 
 248 See McConnell, supra note 229, at 165 (arguing that the Court’s refusal to explain the “grounds for 
[the] disagreement or why Congress was mistaken” closed the door on the possibility of congressional 
interpretation of the clause). 
 249 Flores, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 250 Id. at 533. 
 251 Id. at 532. 
 252 Id. at 530–32. 
 253 Id. at 533–35. 
 254 Waldron, supra note 187, at 45 (citing Ring W. Lardner, THE YOUNG IMMIGRUNTS Ch. 10 (1920)). 
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matter of interpreting the Free Exercise Clause.  But it may also catch the fit 
between this one-sided conversation and the concept of rights informing the 
proportionality analysis conducted in the wake of the Court’s assertion of 
exclusive interpretive authority. 
Flores’s use of proportionality analysis allowed the Court to skirt directly 
engaging with the interpretation of the scope of free exercise rights articulated 
in RFRA.  The Court assessed the proportionality of Congress’ judgment in 
RFRA that the free exercise of religion deserves heightened protection, even 
in facially neutral laws that seriously burden religious practices.  Congress 
prioritized rights-as-trumps over the value of a degree of policy discretion for 
itself and the states.  The Court denied Congress the power to prioritize rights-
as-trumps for the states, and then judged that the value of the states’ 
“traditional general regulatory power” outweighed how RFRA could realize 
the value of its own view of the Free Exercise Clause.255  If the Court had 
counter-factually adopted a rights-as-trumps approach, it could deny Congress 
the power to articulate the scope of free exercise and then proceed to reiterate 
why, even if it did have this power, the scope of the right articulated in RFRA’s 
was an interpretive mistake.  Instead, proportionality analysis enabled the 
Court to interrogate Congress’ view of free exercise as a mistaken judgment 
about the value of free exercise as it relates to the value of federalism. 
One Canadian and one American example of dialogue certainly does not 
provide definitive insight into how proportionality reasoning affect interactions 
between courts and legislatures about rights.  These examples do suggest that 
the conceptual devaluations and distortions of rights-as-proportionality can 
have negative institutional effects on the ability of courts and legislatures to 
democratically negotiate the meaning of rights. 
In the Canadian context, there are less arduous formal institutional 
barriers to a Parliament featuring a majority government in the House of 
Commons articulating its own understanding of Charter rights in disagreement 
with prior judicial decisions.  Yet the use of proportionality analysis in Carter 
created an obstacle to a majority government attempting to enforce a Supreme 
Court judgment.  And a Quebec court recently invalidated Parliament’s 
attempt to restrict assisted suicide to individuals with a reasonably foreseeable 
death as a disproportionate infringement on the right announced in Carter.256  
 
 255 Flores, 521 U.S. at 534. 
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That casts a shadow over claims that proportionality encourages courts to 
listen to legislative deliberation about rights and legislatures to take 
responsibility for such deliberation. 
In the American context, the Supreme Court made a clear statement about 
the scope of the free exercise right as a limited trump in Smith, and thereby 
left room for Congress to disagree and articulate an alternative interpretation 
of that right in RFRA.257  This indicates that judicial refusals to balance rights 
can promote legislative responsibility for rights, even where legislation such as 
RFRA can face potential opposition from the executive and the judiciary.  The 
use of proportionality reasoning in Flores to shut down engagement with a 
strong Congressional articulation of rights does not support the claims of 
American proponents of rights-as-proportionality. 
The interrogative quality of Carter and Flores orient dialogues towards the 
question of whether the legislature has learned to properly balance the value 
of rights, and judicial values must have the last word.  That’s not exactly a 
recipe for democratic negotiations about the scope and nature of rights.  Given 
the admirable concern for the need to democratically settle reasonable 
disagreements about rights among proportionality’s proponents, the Canadian 
experience with proportionality analysis should serve as a warning rather than 
an exemplar. 
V. TWO CONSTRUCTIVE LESSONS 
This Article has argued that proportionality analysis can devalue and 
distort rights in ways that disrupt democracy.  This does not show that 
American rights jurisprudence is wholly afflicted with proportionality analysis, 
but it does point out how strands of proportionality style reasoning are 
responsible for the devaluation and distortion of some U.S. constitutional 
rights—even if such reasoning is not explicitly deployed in a uniform doctrine 
resembling the Canadian Oakes test.  It shows how the Canadian 
proportionality approach to rights is much less exemplary of treating rights 
reasonably than many Americans may think.  This Article does not develop 
an alternative vision for how American rights jurisprudence might better 
protect rights while realizing the democratic settlement of moral disagreements 
that implicate rights.  However, the comparison between American and 
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Canadian rights jurisprudence does suggest two important constructive lessons 
for both countries. 
The first lesson is that treating rights as absolute relations of justice that 
cannot be overridden is compatible with democratic legislatures helping to 
establish their scope in the face of moral disagreement about such rights.  Not 
only are statutory rights conceivable as absolute moral rights, they tend to be 
quite institutionally secure against all branches of the state but the legislature.258  
This should be clear to students of the Westminster constitutionalism, as 
disagreement about rights in systems featuring Parliamentary sovereignty are 
resolved by statutes that are fairly immune to changes or overrides by judicial 
and bureaucratic officials.259  This is why even fundamental rights, such as U.K. 
citizens’ right to vote, can be conceived of as morally absolute.  Their 
constitutive statutory requirements cannot be overridden without being 
formally changed,260 but remain subject to reasonable disagreement about their 
scope in certain cases,261 and only institutionally subject to change by the 
Queen-in-Parliament. 
If an adult U.K. citizen fulfills and follows the statutory requirements 
qualifying them to vote for a Member of Parliament in their constituency, their 
right is morally and institutionally secured against being ‘infringed’ or changed 
by a judge or elections official in the name of the general welfare.262  Their 
specified right also remains morally absolute against democratic changes given 
widespread political commitment to its protection, even while it is 
institutionally not absolute against such changes enacted by the U.K. 
Parliament.263  This idea that statutory provisions can establish morally absolute 
 
258  YOWELL, supra note 1, at 25. 
 259 Id. at 26. 
 260 See, e.g., Representation of the People Act 1983, c.2, § 3 (Eng.) (“A convicted person during the 
time that he is detained in a penal institution in pursuance to his sentence is legally incapable of voting 
at any parliamentary or local government election.” (emphasis added)). 
 261 Cf. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 849 (2005) (finding the U.K.’s blanket ban on 
prisoner voting violated the European Convention on Human Rights’ Article 3 right to free elections).  
The decision did not invalidate the impugned statute, but it did spark a debate about prisoner voting 
in the U.K. that has not yet been resolved. 
262  Geoffrey Sigalet, Proportionality’s Reductio Ad Monitum, 23 REV. CONST. STUD. 341, 347–48 
(2018) (citing YOWELL, supra note 1, at 25) (describing the example in common law jurisdictions of 
a Conservation Officer being disallowed from violating a fisherman’s right to fish in the name of the 
general welfare). 
 263 See generally BELLAMY, supra note 181, at 3–4 (arguing that in working democracies, the effort to 
constrain rights in reference to those outlined in written constitutions ignore the natural development 
of rights as contained in the political process). 
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rights tends to escape Canadians suffering from pre-1982 amnesia and 
Americans overly keen on contrasting statutory and constitutional law.  
Elevating the moral and democratic importance of statutory rights provisions 
is much more consistent with the Anglo-American tradition of 
constitutionalism than denigrating the justice of constitutional rights by 
subjecting them to proportionate statutory infringements. 
The second lesson is that in order to settle moral disagreements about 
rights more democratically, it is necessary for courts to countenance statutes 
as potentially specifying the absolute scope and nature of constitutional rights.  
This may seem a bridge too far given the axiom of constitutionalism that 
entrenched constitutional rights are not subject to change by ordinary statutes.  
We need not abandon a commitment to constitutionalism to admit that 
entrenched rights are often vague and underspecified two term jural relations 
of the form “A has the right to X.”264  Statutory rights often have a three term 
jural relation between a right-holder A, an action φ, and B, a person or set of 
persons with no right to interfere with A’s right.265  That enables them to help 
resolve the finer points of moral disagreements about the scope of vague 
constitutional rights.266  And if we admit that ordinary statutes can articulate 
morally absolute rights with democratic input, then it seems reasonable that 
statutes can help construct the meaning of fundamental rights. 
In the contexts of the American and Canadian constitutional bills of rights, 
recognizing statutory rights constructions will involve judicial review.  Judicial 
review of the constitutionality of statutory rights is actually necessary to help 
distinguish purely statutory rights from those bearing on the scope of 
entrenched rights, while also remedying violations of such rights.267  This is 
aptly demonstrated by RFRA, which required the co-ordinate participation of 
the judiciary to protect a Congressional articulation of free exercise rights.268  
But this second lesson is incompatible with the Canadian and American 
Supreme Courts’ occasional claims to judicial supremacy, such as the 
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American Supreme Court’s declaration in Boerne that it is the exclusive 
interpreter of constitutional rights.269 
Sharing interpretive power is constitutionally sound because both the U.S. 
Constitution’s Article VI and the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 52 require 
the supremacy of their respective constitutions, and neither grants any 
institution absolute authority over what the constitutions demands.270  And 
even judicial declarations of judicial supremacy such as Boerne’s are often 
belied by future judicial decisions accepting legislative constructions of rights 
at odds with precedent.271  Extra-judicial constitutional construction is a legal 
and political reality in both American272 and Canadian constitutional law.273  
Coordinating the construction of constitutional rights between the branches 
also follows James Madison’s argument in The Federalist No. 37 that legally 
vague constitutional provisions should be “liquidated” or constructed by 
“series” of both legislative “discussions” and judicial “adjudications.”274 
 
269  See, e.g., Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J. concurring) (“When the political branches of the 
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already 
issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents 
with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary 
expectations must be disappointed.”); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 
519, para. 17 (Can.) (“The healthy and important promotion of a dialogue between the legislature 
and the courts should not be debased to a rule of ‘if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again’.”). 
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WEINER, THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION (2019). 
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274  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 183 (James Madison).  For a more complete account of Madison’s 
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STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (explaining the concept of constitutional liquidation to provide an 
understanding of the role of history in constitutional law).  For other similar accounts of constitutional 
construction, see KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5–14 (1999); 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2011).  
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Together, these lessons indicate that a more democratic rights 
jurisprudence will recognize statutes as sources constructing the scope and 
nature of just rights, without giving up the judicial role of remedying violations 
of rights in particular cases and circumstances.  How exactly this should 
influence the doctrines of American and Canadian rights jurisprudence is well 
beyond the scope of this article.  There are a number of adjudicative methods 
and sources of law that might be used to better integrate statutes into the 
construction of constitutional rights.  And there is no reason why evidence of 
the original meaning, longstanding practices implicating rights, precedent 
setting judicial decisions and statutes, and even moral reasoning concerning 
rights cannot all help legislatures and courts specify the morally absolute scope 
of constitutional rights.275  Reforming the way courts and legislatures approach 
rights to respect the moral absoluteness of rights while relaxing the institutional 
absoluteness of judicial decisions about rights promises to be a complex task. 
Courts, legislators, and scholars undertaking this complicated task run the 
risk of legally warping reasonable moral disagreements about rights, but this is 
simply one of the risks of constitutionally entrenching rights as fundamental 
law.  The risk inherent in reconciling the many principles, methods, and types 
of evidence available to delimit entrenched rights is offset by the reward of 
democratically protecting the morally valuable rights entrenched in a 
constitution.  That being said, it’s worth dealing with the pragmatic objection 
to the task of reforming rights jurisprudence along the lines I have suggested. 
Perhaps U.S. proponents of proportionality will seize on and defend some 
of the cases of balancing this paper has traced to strands of American rights 
jurisprudence.  They may object that extricating balancing will require radically 
uprooting the compelling interest test in strict scrutiny cases, or, following the 
proposal of Justice Thomas’ and other commentators, trashing the tiers of 
scrutiny altogether.276  Canadian commentators may similarly object to 
reforming the proportionality framework embodied in Oakes.  It is possible 
to respond to these criticisms by biting the bullet and arguing for overturning 
the tiers of scrutiny and Oakes.  Even so, recent Canadian jurisprudence 
indicates that it is plausible to renovate doctrines entangled in proportionality 
style reasoning so that they guide courts to reason about the content and scope 
of absolute rights.  This suggests that opponents of proportionality may not 
 
275 Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745 (2015). 
276  See Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016) (Thomas J., dissenting) 
(“[Tiers of scrutiny] labels now mean little.”). 
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need to advocate outright opposition to the tiers of scrutiny to curtail the 
disruption of rights. 
In the recent case of Frank v. Canada, the majority of the Canadian 
Supreme Court balked at Justices Côté and Brown’s questioning the Oakes 
test’s legacy of conflating the constitutionality of “limitations” with potentially 
“justified infringements” of rights.277  But, as Justices Côté and Brown’s dissent 
in Frank makes elegantly clear, even the minimal impairment and balancing 
steps of the Oakes test could be renovated to justify how reasonable a court’s 
judgment about the scope of a right is.278  They look to the statutory means of 
restricting the right to vote to citizens residing in Canada for five-years and, 
rather than attempting to justify this restriction as an infringement of rights, 
they find reasons why it is a reasonable means “to define and shape the 
boundaries of a positive entitlement which, as such, necessarily requires 
legislative specification.”279 
This would reorient the Oakes inquiry towards establishing why the 
legislation specifies the scope of the right rather than violating it.  In cases 
where rights are violated, the minimal impairment and proportionality prongs 
could be similarly subverted away from attempting to justify an infringement, 
and towards supporting the reasons why legislation violates the scope of a right. 
If Oakes could be reformed, then so too could American strands of 
proportionality style reasoning.  The variegated American approach could be 
reformed by breathing new life into the kind of tradition oriented test for 
establishing the scope of due process rights in Washington v. Glucksberg, and 
extending this to other rights.280  Instead of rejecting the tiers of scrutiny, the 
Court could emphasize how governmental interests in limiting rights must help 
specify the scope and boundaries of rights.  The live question concerning the 
scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms at stake in New York 
State Rifle & Pistol Association Ltd. v. New York was held to be rendered 
moot by New York State amending its firearms licensing statute and New York 
City loosening its restrictions on firearms transportation.281  But Justice Alito’s 
 
277 Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1 at paras. 120–125 (Côté, J. and Brown J., 
dissenting). 
278 Id. at paras. 160–172. 
 279 Id. at para. 124. 
 280 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 281 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020). 
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dissent (and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence) show that similar future cases 
could become a chance for the Court to explain how a government’s interest 
in restricting the transportation of handguns can or cannot be found in the 
“text, history, and tradition” defining the scope of the Second Amendment 
right.282 
When inquiring into the City’s justification for restricting the 
transportation of firearms to second homes or shooting ranges outside of the 
City, Justice Alito rejected both historical and public interest arguments.283  
Interestingly, Justice Alito starts his analysis by reviewing Heller’s holding 
about how the scope of the right to bear arms extends to the right to keep a 
handgun in the home for self-defense, and to transport such guns for 
maintenance, lawfully transferring ownership, and “to gain and maintain the 
skill necessary to use it responsibly.”284  He then turns to the historical evidence 
in the founding era for laws that prevented gun-owners from practicing outside 
of city limits.  The City argued that founding era municipalities restricted the 
places firearms could be used within their jurisdiction, but Justice Alito 
dismisses this because the petitioners were claiming the “right to practice at 
ranges and competitions outside the City, and neither the City, the courts 
below, nor any of the many amici supporting the City have shown that 
municipalities during the founding era prevented gun owners from taking their 
 
282  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 
(2020).  Consider what might have happened if the case had not been rendered moot.  On the one 
hand, it could have made strategic sense for Justice Breyer et al. to argue that the original textual 
meaning, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment compel deference because they are 
sufficiently indeterminate regarding whether blanket bans on the transportation of short-barreled 
weapons would have been understood to violate the right to bear arms.  This would be presumably 
more acceptable to several of his fellow justices than repeating his balancing argument in Heller.  On 
the other hand, Justice Kavanaugh et al. might be tempted to find new evidence for why handgun 
transportation bans might have been unacceptable at the founding, or, perhaps more promisingly, at 
the time of the Reconstruction Amendments that incorporate the Second Amendment against the 
states.  Note that in the sequel to Heller, then-Judge Kavanaugh, considering an automatic weapons 
ban at the D.C. Circuit, explicitly argued that Heller bound lower courts with the implicit “clear 
message” that “[c]ourts should not apply strict or intermediate scrutiny but should instead look to 
text, history, and tradition to define the scope of the right and assess gun bans and regulations.”  
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting).  
283 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1544 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
284 Id. at 1541. 
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guns outside city limits for practice.”285  He finally looks to the “public safety” 
arguments and finds them facially weak and unsubstantiated.286 
Justice Alito’s reasoning appears to be primarily informed by rights-as-
trumps, but some questions remain concerning his inquiry into the public 
safety justification.  The way he defines the scope of the rights eschews the 
proportionality approach of treating the right to bear arms as an overridable 
interest that extends to all examples of citizens having their use of firearms 
restricted by law.  And his historical inquiry appears oriented towards 
establishing the scope of the right to transfer arms as it related to 
municipalities. 
But his public safety analysis may leave room for the City to justifiably 
violate the (presumptively) historically determinate right to transfer arms given 
the proper demonstration that travel restrictions promoted public safety.  In 
order for the Court to avoid using heightened scrutiny as a kind of balancing 
inquiry, arguments such as the public safety justification must be blended into 
the analysis of the text, history, and tradition establishing the scope of the right.  
This wouldn’t be hard to do.  For example, Justice Alito could have noted that 
in order for public interest justifications to be on the table, the City must show 
that these were historically acceptable grounds for municipalities to restrict 
travel with firearms in the founding or reconstruction eras.  Given the historical 
question marks over Heller surveyed in Part III above, this approach might 
also give the City and Justice Breyer much to say in response. 
Outside of the Second Amendment, the Court could also turn away from 
proportionality style reasoning by reversing its increasing trend of using its 
compelling interest analysis to uphold violations of rights such as freedom of 
speech,287 and instead use it to explain why various asserted government 
interests fail to exempt a statutory provision or regulation from the scope of a 
right. 
It’s difficult to see how such reforms are more radical than moving towards 
the example of the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Frank.  The 
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majority in Frank found basic statutory qualifications on the right to vote such 
as residency requirements to be infringements of that right in need of 
philosophical justification.  The right to vote existed in Canada before the 
1982 patriation of the Charter and its section 3 enumeration of the right.  The 
pre-1982 statutory right to vote was constituted by laws specifying the very 
kinds of qualifications that the Court now unreasonably views as 
“infringements.”288 
CONCLUSION 
Arguments for reforming American rights jurisprudence to incorporate 
proportionality analysis seek the goals of better valuing rights and clarifying 
disagreements about rights for the betterment of democracy.  These goals are 
clearly admirable.  But introducing or expanding the role of proportionality 
analysis into the way American courts analyze rights questions may prove an 
unreasonable means of achieving these interests.  Canadian eyes may see more 
clearly where such means will lead, and the view isn’t pretty for those with a 
healthy distaste for rights inflation, unaccountable judicial law-making, and bad 
faith dialogues about rights between elected officials and judges.  The means 
are not so much disproportionate to these ends as inimical to them. 
The silver lining is that thinking through why proportionality analysis is 
unlikely to “lower the stakes of politics” provides us with basic insights about 
how to reform Canadian and American rights adjudication to more 
democratically protect the value of rights and the clarity of our disagreements 
about them.289  Courts must treat rights as morally absolute, but democratically 
accommodate disagreements about the scope of their obligatory requirements 
by institutionally recognizing legislative and traditional sources of meaning.  
The need for these lessons would not surprise H. L. A. Hart, who once noted 
that the two most remarkable aspects of American jurisprudence for the 
English lawyer are the U.S. Supreme Court’s declaration of its power to 
invalidate Congressional statutes and its doctrine of finding procedurally 
sound laws to be invalid violations of due process because they “did not satisfy 
the requirement of vague undefined standards of reasonableness or 
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desirability.”290  He found these phenomena “hard to justify in a democracy.”291  
Proportionality analysis makes it even harder to justify the legitimacy of 
constitutional judicial review.  Clipping back proportionality judgments may 
make it easier. 
  
 
 290 HART, supra note 15, at 124–125. 
 291 Id. at 125. 
192 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
   
 
 
